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Introduction 
The aim of the seminar from which these papers and discussions 
derived was to analyse the basic causes and underlying political 
dynamics of the two related conflicts that were then (September 1978) 
* 
welling up betweeen Vietnam , Kampuchea and China . Since that time , 
the earlier low-level· violence of 1977-78 has escalated dramatically into 
open warfare , following the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea on 
December 25 in support of an insurgent Khiner ·�ational United Front 
for National Salvation', the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime and 
the installation of Heng Samrin as head of a new Kampuchean government 
backed by Vietnam . These developments resulted in a sharp intensification 
of the Sino-Soviet rift , a serious blow to China's prestige as 
Kampuchea's protector, Hanoi's further 'tilt' towards Russia and away 
from China , and finally the Chinese invasion of Vietnamese territory 
on 17 February . 
This widened the international ramifications of the conflict 
dangerously at the level of global power politics . Yet although the 
consequences of this further chain of events have been far-reaching , 
they do not contradict or outdate significantly the analysis of the 
motivations and objectives of the various antagonists, as set out in 
these papers last September . The underlying logic of the situation 
in which the various antagonists have found themselves has worked 
itself out inexorably , but not in unexpected ways . The potentiality 
for an intensified conflict was plain to see even then , although most 
of us hoped that restraint and moderation would prevail . What none 
of us could then anticipate was whether the conflicts would escalate, 
or how far , or with just what effects on the other participants in 
the drama . 
No attempt has been made , therefore , to modify the papers 
presented here in order to take account of subsequent events . Their 
* 
For the sake of convenience rather than consistency , the terms Kampuchea 
and Cambodia have both been used interchangeably by different authors 
in these papers . The name officially used by the Pol Pot regime 
between 1975-79 was Democratic Kampuchea . 
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relevance has not been substantially diminished . Most of the key 
elements in the later situation can nearly all be seen here in embryo. 
Instead , some brief comments on later events will be given here in 
order to relate the earlier discussions to the rapidly developing 
situation of early 1979. 
One point that these papers and discussions do underline is 
that the origins of the two conflicts must be traced back to their 
local roots; they are not to be explained just in terms of great power 
rivalries . The latter are important in shaping the international 
parameters , of course , but it is local factors and attitudes which 
in the last resort are likely to prove the decisive ones . The 
intransigence of the Kampuchean regime of Pol Pot towards Hanoi 
throughout 1977-78 is hard to comprehend unless we take into account 
the quite extraordinary antagonism Kampucheans have long felt towards 
the Vietnamese . David Chandler made a revealing observation on the 
long list of very basic differences between the two peoples , that 
'the cultural frontier between Vietnam and Kampuchea (is) one of 
the sharpest in Southeast Asia' . Also important has been the long 
history of friction between the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the 
Communist Party of Vietnam, traced here by Ben Kiernan and Carlyle 
Thayer . In those circumstances the gradual intensification of the 
disputes between the two governments into open conflict becomes more 
readily comprehensible , although it still seems almost incredible 
that the Pol Pot government remained so obdurate against compromise 
and at times even provocative towards the Vietnamese during the 
earlier stages of the dispute , when a negotiated settlement might 
more easily have been achieved. We can now see , as we could not see 
last September , that by pushing Hanoi's leaders to the point of all­
out intervention the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea were bringing 
about their own downfall. 
Likewise, the historical background to China's modes of thinking 
about her relations with Vietnam is revealing , as Wang Gungwu's fine 
survey brings out . The view of Indochina from Peking is inevitably 
very different from Southeast Asian views: yet traditional Chinese 
views no longer seem to fit the present day situation in the new 
Southeast Asia . 
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Mr Whitlam's contribution to the seminar directed attention 
to another important dimension of the current situation in Vietnam, 
the refugee problems . We hear little in Australia about the expulsion 
of Vietnamese from Kampuchea which is creating a flow of refugees into 
Vietnam far greater than the more widely reported exodus of Chinese 
refugees from that country . Mr Whitlam had visited Vietnam only a 
few weeks before the seminar and talked extensively with Vietnamese 
leaders . 
If we compare the political situation that has developed in 
Indochina since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea with that which 
prevailed at the time these papers were given , the most striking 
difference has been the greater prominence of the international 
politics of the conflict vis-a-vis the local factors . Although Chinese 
support for the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea and Soviet support for 
Vietnam were becoming increasingly important elements in the power 
equation prior to December 197 8 , these were essentially secondary 
rather than primary considerations . They would not have stood in the 
way of a negotiated settlement if the Hanoi and Phnom Penh authorities 
had been disposed to reach one . And it seems probable that if such 
a settlement could have been achieved the Vietnam-China dispute too 
would have abated . Russia's influence in the whole affair was relatively 
unimportant at that stage , despite Vietnam's adherence to COMECON in 
July and the signing of a Russo-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation in November, for the Hanoi leaders were making it 
very clear that they wanted to avoid falling into too great a dependence 
on the Soviet Union . There is every reason to believe that if the Pol 
Pot government had at that stage been replaced from within Kampuchea 
by one more willing to reach agreement with Vietnam, the conflict 
would probably not have escalated in the way it did . 
The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea changed the basic power 
equation quite radically . Not only did it result in the ejection 
of the Pol Pot �overnment from Phnom Penh and its replacement by a 
Hanoi-backed government (although without destroying Pol Pot's 
forces or capturing him, as we shall see) , but it also dramatically 
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reduced Chi na ' s  capacity to i nfluence the course of events there . 
Because the very speed o f  the Vietnam armoured blitzk�ieg enabled 
it to cut off Pol Pot ' s force s ( and other troops resisti ng the 
Vietnamese ) from any source of Chi ne se arms or supplies on a substantial 
scale , China seemed initially to have been dealt out of the poker 
game , unless she was prepared to rai se the stakes to the dangerous 
level of threatening an overt invasion of Vietnam onfuat country ' s  
northern frontier , thereby incurring the ri sk o f  Sovi et counter­
measures and some i nternational critici sm .  After a de lay o f  nearly 
two months the Chine se did embark upon thi s  course , but neither their 
motivations nor their precise obj ective s  are yet c learly apparent at 
the time o f  writing these l ines . Many observers be lieve that China ' s  
motives had more to do with the Sino-Soviet conflict and the global 
balance o f  power ( not least , her own credibi lity in that context ) 
than wi th any parti cular aims related to the Indochina s itua tion , 
apart from her vaguely worded intention to ' puni sh Vietnam ' . On 
the othe r hand , there have been indications that some Chinese 
supplies are again getting through to the anti -Vietnamese gueri l la 
force s in  Kampuchea and that the latter are sti l l  mai ntaining e ffective 
resi stance after nearly two months o f  fi ghting ; so the Chine se 
leaders may have calculated that Vie tnam has not succeeded in sweeping 
the board i n  Kampuchea and may therefore be more vulnerable to Chine se 
pressure than initially seemed likely . 
Clearly , then , the actual situation on the ground in Kampuchea 
may yet prove to be the crucial variable in thi s  equation , j ust as 
much as the great-power calculus o f  gains or losses in  the internat ional 
sphere . Kampuchea's new civi l  war i s ,  in  effect , the j oker i n  the 
pack . I f  it drags on , or deve lops into a hard- fought struggle between 
a Vie tnam-backed government of Kampuchea and a China-backed gueri l la 
resistance whi ch cannot be suppre ssed , the international aspect o f  
the conflict i s  like ly t o  be both dangerous and intrac table . The 
Vie tnamese wi ll  in  that case probably be either re luctant or unable 
(or both ) to wi thdraw their force s ,  which one might have hoped they 
would be wi l ling to do i f  they were con fident that the Heng Samrin 
gove rnment could survive without them . It is not yet clear from the 
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sketchy news reports coming out of Kampuchea whether Heng Samrin's 
government has been able to muster substantial support from opponents 
of the former Pol Pot government , or whether it is regarded by most 
Kampucheans as merely a puppet of the Vietnamese . Presumably the 
intensity of traditional Kampuchean hostility towards the Vietnamese 
will operate increasingly to the advantage of the guerilla forces 
as time passes . It may well be that neither the Vietnamese nor the 
Chinese will find it within their capacity to bring the war to an 
end by a quick and overwhelming military victory or by exerting 
pressure towards a negotiated settlement . That is a dreadful prospect 
for the long-suffering people of Kampuchea . 
This being the case , there is now every likelihood that a drawn­
out and dangerous conflict will ensue , possibly at a low level , but 
ruinous and cruel for both the Kampuchean and the Vietnamese people 
in their currently parlous economic conditions , as well as perilously 
destabilizing for the power balance in the region . Two consequences 
appear almost inevitable . The Vietnamese will be driven even more 
deeply into military and economic dependence upon the Russians . And 
any success the Chinese may have in strengthening the anti-Vietnamese 
forces in Kampuchea will merely aggravate Vietnamese suspicions of 
China's motives , which will probably incline the Hanoi leaders towards 
even greater determination to settle their problems with Kampuchea 
by force rather than by political means and a dash of compromise. 
These considerations have a direct bearing on Australia's 
interests and policies in the dispute . It seems to me axiomatic that 
Australia's primary interest in such a tangled situation is that great 
power involvement in the affairs of the Indochina states should be 
minimized (including China's) , which means also , in effect, that 
internal conflicts should be insulated as far as possible from external 
pressures . In present circumstances , these conditions seem likely 
to obtain only on the basis of some degree of (tacit?) Vietnamese 
hegemony over Kampuchea and Laos . That such a situation probably 
cannot be prevented is , no doubt , unfortunate, but the only foreseeable 
alternative to that is an increase in Chinese political and military 
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leverage in both countries , whi ch i s  bound to be de stabi l izing rather 
than the reverse in present circumstance s .  The basic obj ective that 
Aus tralia and other Southeast Asian governments should keep foremost 
i n  mind mus t surely be to minimize the degree o f  Vie tnamese hegemony 
over Kampuchea, e . g . by increasing the bargaining power and options 
o f  the Heng Samrin government or any other in Phnom Penh , so that 
the Kampucheans are not utterly subservie nt to Hanoi and Moscow , or 
else looking desperate ly towards Peking as the only other pos sible 
source of political support . One might even hope that in the long 
run Kampuchea ' s  leaders mi ght see that there could be advantage s in 
looking towards ASEAN ( as a concep t ,  an international framework , rather 
than an irrunediate counterwei ght to Vietnam or China or Rus s i a )  to 
maximi ze thei r  country ' s  independence and secure i ts terri torial 
integri ty. If the only a lternative scenario is the prospect o f  China 
trying by fair means or foul to infiltrate more weapons and supplies 
to the anti-Vie tname se force s in Kampuchea, or threatening to ' puni sh ' 
or invade Vietnam from the north , the dangers o f  serious con flict 
are very grave. Moreover, it i s  in the long-term interests of 
Australia and al l other governments in thi s  part o f  the world that 
events in I ndochina should deve lop i n  such a way that Vietnam hersel f 
wi l l  not by pushed by the confl ict wi th China into a deeper dependence 
on the Russians , but will feel able to draw back from that dependence 
as soon as possible towards a more equable re lationship with China. 
The geopolitical reali ties o f  thi s  situation have been more 
clearly recogni zed by the ASEAN nations in their re sponse to recent 
events than by the Australian government . The Australian reaction 
has been a matter of playing to the gal lery back home for momentary 
domesti c  politi cal advantage s ,  as on so many forei gn policy i ssue s  
since 1950 , rather than seeking to uti l i ze the rathe r limi ted po liti cal 
influence we do possess towards achieving more important long-term 
obj ectives . Australia ' s  first re ac tion was to condemn the Vietname se 
invasion o f  Kampuchea and to cut off our very mode st forei gn aid prograrrune 
to Vietnam . Thi s meant that we no longer retained any degree of 
' leverage ' whatever vi s-a-vi s Hanoi as the i nternation?l s ituation 
developed further, and also that we were Bound to be regarded by her 
as less than even-handed in our atti tudes to the whole a ffair ' We are 
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at the head of the pack against Vietnam' , according to an Australian 
official quoted in the National Times. That may have been a high­
minded moral response to an act of aggression , but it was not to be 
matched by an equivalent response on the occasion of China's invasion 
of Vietnam . The ASEAN nations , on the other hand , by expressing a 
more restrained reaction initially , have left themselves in a position 
where they could perhaps exercise good off ices towards encouraging 
a negotiated settlement and could thus hope to exert some influence 
on the final outcome . The contrast in terms of political sophistication 
is dismaying . 
* * * * * 
These papers were presented at a seminar organized jointly 
by the Asian Studies Association of Australia and the Research School 
of Pacific Studies of the Australian National University in September 
197 8 . One of the aims of that seminar was to bring together scholars 
with a specialist knowledge of the Asian cou�tries concerned from all 
parts of Australia , along with interested politicians , civil servants 
and journalists . It also served to underline the point made most 
eloquently by Dr Stephen FitzGerald in his Conference Lecture to the 
ASAA Second National Conference at the University of NSW in May 1978, 
that we now have scattered throughout our universities in Australia 
an impressively large and diverse group of scholars with expertise on 
various Asian countries . (The lecture appears in the ASAA Review 2, 
July 1 9 7 8 , pp . 1- 1 3 . )  The seminar was the first attempt to bring many 
of these people together and to air our views publicly on a matter of 
national importance . It is hoped that other such ventures will soon 
follow. 
The organizers wish to express their gratitude to the Australian 
National University SOCPAC Printery, to Malcolm Salmon , Dr Virginia 
Matheson, Jan Grocott and Mr H .  Gunther for their contributions to the 
publication of this set of papers. 
J . A . C .  Mackie 

KAMPUCHEA-VIETNAM: 
THE ROOTS OF STRIFE 
David Chandler 
In this paper I will be dealing with the historical background , 
or what might in some sense be called the excuses for anti-Vietnamese 
feeling in Cambodia. My comments will cover both the colonial era , 
particularly events in the 1830s and 1840s , and the period of Sihanouk's 
rule: I will also discuss those elements of Cambodia ' s  past behaviour 
which have been selected for use by the Kampuchean rulers of today . 
I will say something , and Ben Kiernan will be saying more , about 
the way these choices and animosities can be focussed on the relation­
ship between the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and the Communist 
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Party of Vietnam. 
First on traditional animosity: when I was in Cambodia in 
the 1960s the main events in popular memory were the wars against the 
Vietnamese , the tortures inflicted by the Vietnamese on Cambodians , 
and the joy with which the Cambodians did something they called Kap 
Yuan� which means to 'cut Vietnamese'. 'We are happy killing 
Vietnamese; we no longer fear them , however powerful they may be' , 
wrote a Cambodian official in 1856 . He told his followers to kill all 
the Vietnamese they could find 'from the northern part of the country , 
to the ·southern border' . A magazine which was highly popular in 
Cambodia when printed in 1969 carried a picture of an excited crowd 
of 19th century Cambodians brandishing weapons and shouting slogans 
about their determination to 'kill Vietnamese' . There is a background 
of violence and prejudice , then , which I am going to talk about. On 
the Cambodian side , it is based on perceptions of Vietnamese behaviour . 
On the Vietnamese side, of course, it is based on Vietnamese pressures 
and Cambodian behaviour. 
I think the reason for this prejudice is very simple. The 
cultural frontier between Cambodia and Vietnam seems to me to be the 
sharpest in Southeast Asia . It certainly was very sharp in the 19th 
century. If you moved from one village to the next , you found 
complete changes in such very basic things , besides the language of 
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course , as hairstyle , clothing , food , architecture (Cambodian houses 
on stilts , Vietnamese houses on the ground) , kitchen utensils , alphabet , 
educational systems , agricultural techniques , treatment of the dead , 
foreign relations , attitudes towards history . . .  you could go on and 
make an almost complete set of oppositions �outside of the day-to­
day business which occupied rice farmers and fishermen . 
In terms of behaviour , the record becomes especially detailed 
in the 19th century when you have the filling out of southern Vietnam 
with resident Vietnamese , the weakening or breaking up of the Cambodian 
court , and some events of the early 19th century such as Vietnamese 
and Thai occupation of Cambodia at various times . There was a set of 
alternating loyalties on the part of the royal family between the 
Thai and Vietnamese . If a ruler had a Vietnamese alliance , pretenders 
to the throne would have a Thai alliance; this conflict would be 
solved by invasions or occupations by both countries . Now to give three 
quotations from the Vietnamese . It seems to me that they have a sort 
of timeless quality that some of you might even recognize from the 
period of American involvement in Vietnam . Says the Vietnamese emperor 
in 1814: 'Thanks to the power of our court they (the Cambodians) have 
regained their country and chased out the enemies . Therefore they 
should now try to manage things so as to act in future in a coordinated 
manner , just as vvhen one raises one's arms , one's fingers rise in 
harmony' . The l 7th volume of the Vietnames.� annals says this about the 
Cambodians: 'They must work harder , more laboriously , they should 
learn to speak Vietnamese , and our dress and eating habits should also 
be followed . If there is any outdated , uncivilized custom that they 
have it should be made simpler , or should pe dropped , and we should 
work to achieve this goal' . This is the 'civilizing mission' , of 
course , about 50 years before the French arrived to proclaim their own . 
In the 20th volume of the annals there is a passage that seems to me 
very familiar nowadays . A rebellion against the Vietnamese had broken 
out . Says the emperor: 'The Cambodian nation , ever since it became 
a tributary of our court , has suffered no hardship or oppression , why 
should its people then be so turbulen t  and unfaithful to us'? And, 
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praising the Cambodian monarch in public correspondence, he complained 
in secret, 'the Cambodians have always been impervious to our conunands'. 
Telling them in public that they had matured, he referred to them in 
private as 'monkeys in pens and birds in cages' . That kind of language, 
of course, does rot help a diplomatic dialogue very much . When you add 
to this the violence that laid Cambodia to waste in the period 1830-1850, 
you have a legacy of contempt and resentment on either side, reinforced 
by a sense of superiority and repeated anger which have changed very 
little from regime to regime in either country . The current regime 
in Vietnam, whatever its innermost feelings may be, is certainly working 
hard to overcome its old feelings of superiorityi but in view of 
the long memories that people have , it seems to me that Kampuchean 
authorities think that no matter what the Vietnamese say, the 
authorities in Vietnam still believe what they always believed; and 
if they say the opposite, they are merely (and as usual) lying . 
In the colonial era, Vietnamese villages in southeast Cambodia 
were encapsulated in the landscape. By the late 19th century they 
tended to be Catholic and allowed no intermarriage with local 
Cambodians, unlike the Chinese . Vietnamese did not intermarry, even 
with Chinese . 
The Vietnamese fitted into the French school system rapidly, 
and the Vietnamese in Cambodia were used by French bureaucrats in 
provincial administration . If you look at the personnel roles of a 
provincial French residency, you find of the twelve or so Indochinese 
employees who would be working under a French resident, ten would be 
Vietnamese (with recognizably Vietnamese names) and only two would 
be Cambodians . These would be employed as translators. They were 
not clerks; they were not in charge of public works; they were not. 
in charge of accounts or of research . This is a point I may be over­
stressing, but it would seem that the Cambodian peasant in thel930s, 
insofar as he was in touch with authorities at all, would probably 
have been in face-to-face contact with a Vietnamese bureaucrat 
rather than with a Cambodian or with a Frenchman. I am sure that it 
would be easy to resent that . The first nationalist newspaper that 
came out in Cambodi a in 1 9 36 obj e cted to the presence o f  Vietnamese 
in the government . The se edi torials did no t only ask why are the re 
not more Cambodi ans , but why the re were so many Vi etnamese . Other 
aspects of Vie tnamese behaviour are the foundation of the Indochinese 
Communi st P arty in 1 9 3 0i no Cambodi an component, a fter al l ,  was 
envi saged be fore 1951 , as Ben Kiernan wi l l  poi nt out. Shi f ting now 
to the Cambodi an component of the 1 950 s , you wi ll  find a tremendous 
re sentment against the Vie tnamese among the Cambodi an communis ts and 
what they fe lt to be the sell out by the Vie tname se at Geneva . The 
Vie tnamese al lowed the Sihanouk delegation to make all  the points in 
terms of Cambodi a's fut ure, and allowed no internal role for the 
communi st forces .  These , in fact, had not been terribly active, but 
the re were several thousand of them who were subj ected to repre ssion 
by the Sihanouk regime in the 1 950s and 1960s . In the Sihanouk 
period, of course , the re were frequent border clashes and some 
Sihano uk -bai ti ng by the South Vietnamese regime, perhaps encouraged 
by the Americans . The Vie tnamese in Cambodia i tself  were aloof 
from Cambodi an pol i tics. This meant that local people were suspicious 
of them , and be l ieved that they were aliens �eithe r Catholic or 
communi st. Perhaps they we re right . It has not been studi ed , but 
places of Vietnamese population density in Cambodia, such as the rubber 
plantations and the fisheries in Kampong Chhnang , tended to be active 
in supporti ng the Vie tnam resistance. Also these areas . tended to be 
where the Cambodi an Communi st Party set down i ts roots in the period 
1945-54 more easi ly than in other parts of the country. 
Le t us shi ft now to those aspects o f  the pa st which the Pol Pot 
regime has selected for i ts use . I use these words wi th care because 
') 
a great deal o f  Cambodia ' s  past has been rej ected ent i rely by the regime.� 
Khieu Samphan , for ins tance, has said that the commune s in Kampuchea 
have led to 'all  sorts of depraved social and cul tural blemi she s bei ng 
wiped out ' .  He spoke o f  phases i n  Cambodian history from the time o f  
slavery t o  the liberation of  1 9 75 .  In 1 9 7 7  communi st theori s ts pushed 
enli ghtenment back 15 ye ars to the foundation of the Communi s t  Party 
in Kampuchea in 1960. For some reason they s tart their ere: in the 
year AD 1. The re were , therefore , 1960 years of 'sl avery' in Cambodi a ' s 
past an idea easy to peddle and to memorize , but impossible to 
confi rm. 
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There are four things in the past which would be useful for our 
discussions today. They are selected out of Cambodia's past experience. 
One is that peasants built Angkor. The cormnunists do not go into 
detail as to why this was done � and do not tackle the issue of 
voluntary servitude at all. 
Secondly, they point out that the peasants defeated the Americans 
under the leadership of the CPK. Thirdly, that traditional patriotism 
involved the killing of Vietnamese . Kampuchea Dossier, a book put 
out by the Vietnamese government in 1978, describes a recent Cambodian 
raid on a Vietnamese village where people came in yelling ' Kap Yuon' 
which is the cry , of course , of the 1840s. This cry, ironically 
enough, was the essence of Cambodian nationalism under Lon Nol. The 
only aspect of the marshal's policies (if you can call them that) which 
people recognized as legitimate was his sponsorship of anti-Vietnamese 
behaviour. 
The fourth point which is useful for our purposes today is to 
see what the leaders have selected or chosen in their negotiating 
tactics and positions, vis-a-vis the Vietnamese. The key point here 
is that from 1954 onward , Cambodian diplomacy consisted of, and I am 
quoting Steve Heder here, demanding acquiescence to prepared Cambodian 
texts. Cambodians said: 'Here is our text; you can take it or leave 
it; there is no flexibility in it' . This is a tactic that succeeded 
in Geneva in 1954 , when Cambodian representatives kept repeating their 
position without change. Finally, they wore down the likes of Molotov, 
which took some doing. Later, Sihanouk and his colleagues said that 
all it takes to succeed in diplomacy is to keep repeating things until 
people give you what you want. This was Cambodia's policy towar6 
Vietnam in the 1960s, and the key time here is 1966-67, when Sihanouk 
was demanding guarantees of land frontiers. This meant recognition 
by foreigners of Cambodian maps. These maps, of course, are not 
dishonest; but Sihanouk refused to enter into discussions as to the 
ambiguities of frontiers on different editions of French Indochinese 
maps. When he asked countries for their support , they gave it to him 
or refused to give it to him, for various reasons. The government of 
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South Vietnam , for instance , refused to give i t ,  saying roughly: 
' We ' d  like to talk about these i s sue s rather than j ust acquiesce to 
them ' . The Uni ted S tates re fused for the same reasons , saying , 
' Thi s i sn ' t  our busine ss � thi s i s  something that you should talk 
about wi th the Vietnamese ' . Now the NLF , of course , for reasons of 
thei r  own , qui ckly signed the agreement ,  indeed ceremonially signed 
i t ,  and said , ' Yes  we do acquiesce to them ' .  What you find now is that 
the Sociali st Republic of Vietnam wants to pursue negotiati ons whi le 
Kampuchea sticks to the Sihanouk/NLF posi tion , saying in fact , ' you 
already agreed in 1966/6 7 ' .  The SRV i s  an incumbent regime rather 
than a revolutionary one . Now i t  has to take a position saying , we 
are open to talk about these things but we are not goi ng to accept 
your position . Thi s  means that they are pursuing the same sort of 
' treacherous ' policies that they have always been noted for by the 
Cambodi an people . I t  seems to me that one tragedy o f  Cambodia i s  
that i ts leade rs seem to b e  unable to accept the fact that Cambodia/ 
Kampuchea , at least in the eye s of other nations ( or rather Kampuchea ' s  
national i nterests and the fate o f  Kampuchea ' s people ) are simply not 
as important as the people and interests o f  other state s. This i s  
something that S ihanouk never realized; and i t  i s  to hi s credi t that 
he did nnt .  Cambodia was the most important country in hi s field o f  
vi sion and s o  i t  i s  too i n  the field o f  vi sion of the P o l  P o t  regime . 
The society was as hierarchi sed as any in Southeast Asia before 1970 
and i t  now re fuses to accept compromi se or humi lity in any public form . 
Thi s  is not playing a game , thi s  i s  the busine ss o f  the Vie tnamese 
saying , ' Why then when we he lped you so much (and the Vi etnamese he lp 
is never men tioned publicly ) , why are you so turbulent and unfai thful? ' 
Why can they not (as Americans often complained about Vi etnam ) j us t  
b e  reasonable? Now the Vietnamese , like the Ame ri cans be fore the war , 
but nowhere near as hypocri tical ly, want a ' reasonable solution ' 
to problems in Southeast Asia, so that they can get on wi th the j ob 
o f  consolidati ng their progre ss afte r years o f  suf fering . Thi s does 
not mean necessari ly that Cambodia has to take a back seat in an 
Indochine se federation dominated by the Vietnamese , but i t  does mean 
that the Cambodians should stop shooting at the Vietnamese and stop 
ye l ling at the Vietnamese and stop behaving as i f  they we re a country 
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that needed so much respect . Nations now behave with less fervour 
and with perhaps more realism, whereas the regime in Democratic 
Kampuchea (like all the regimes in Cambodia since 1 945) is inward­
looking, with an immense memory, very proud of victories which might 
not to outsiders seem significant but are victories nonetheless; 
and in 197 7  at least a willingness forced on it by its leaders and 
shared by a great many of its people to behave in the international 
arena, i . e . , vis-a-vis Vietnam, with the same intensity that had 
succeeded in the revolution . The obvious question to ask here is 
why they do this . I am not sure I have an answer . I am sure, however, 
that valuable ideas will emerge in the following papers and discussion 
and I close with a quotation from a Cambodian schoolmaster, written in 
the 1940s: 'Since ancient times our kingdom has been poor in 
solidarity but rich in passion, and this has attracted the ill will 
of foreign powers' . This is very poignant, and very true . And the end, 
unless it is the end of a viable Cambodian state (which seems to me 
a faint possibility, but not something I wish for) , is nowhere in 
sight . 
Foo tnotes 
1 .  My account draws heavily on a paper by Steve Heder, 'The Historical 
Basis of the Kampuchea-Vietnam Conflict: the Development of the 
Kampuchean Communist Movement and its Relations with Vietnamese 
Communism, 19 30- 70 ' ,  to be published in Bu l le tin of Concerned Asian 
Scholars, 1979  (forthcoming) . 
2. For a fuller discussion of this rejection of the past, see David 
Chandler, 'The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea: the Semantics 
of Revolutionary Change', Pacific Affairs, Fall 1976 . 
KAMP UCHEA-VI ETNAM: 
THE CONTEMPORARY CONFL I CT 
B en Kie rnan 
The Indochina Communist Party ( ICP ) was formed i n  19 3 0 . 
Initially termed the Vietnam Communi st Party , the name was changed to 
trie I CP soon after , at Comintern i nstigation . Whi le thi s re flected 
proletarian internationali sm it also coincided wi th tradi tional 
Vi etnamese attitudes of paternali sm towards Kampuche� and 
Laos . I n  an early letter ' to comrades in Cambodia ' the I CP leadership 
wrote that ' Cambodia has no right to a separate Communi st Party ' , and 
that ' there i s  no way we can envi sage a separate Cambodian revolution. 
There can only be one Indochine se revo lution ' .  Although there was 
recognition of the right to sel f-determination of ' minori ty populations ' ,  
thi s was de scribed as coming within the framework of a ' Union of 
Soviet Republics o f  Indochina ' . 1 Thi s  was the thinking in the 19 30s . 
Thi s  pos i tion was modi fied in 194 0 , when the Eighth P lenum of 
the Central Commi ttee o f  the ICP reso lved ' to settle the national 
question wi thin the framewor� of each of the three countries of Vie tnam , 
Laos and Kampuchea , and . . .  to create favourable condi tions for the 
Kampuchean and Lao peop les to deve lop the spiri t of i ndependence and 
sove reignty I 2 But attitudes o f  Vie tname se superiori ty remained 
in the ICP . In June 195 0 , during the armed struggle against the French, 
the I CP-sponsored Kampuchean Peop le ' s  Liberat ion Commi ttee opened a 
poli tical training school for cadre s in the liberated areas of Kampuchea . 
According to Vietnam News Agency , the programme of studi e s  included the 
politi cal policy of the Cambodian revolution as part o f  t11e Indochin0se 
revolution, and the expe riences of the Vie tname se revo lution ' .  3 
Then in 1951 the ICP was divided into three parties : the 
Vietnam Workers ' Party , the Lao People ' s  Revolutionary Party , and the 
Kampuchean People ' s  Party . Since that date , the Vietnamese party has 
made no public mention of an ' Indochina Federation ' ,  whi le cons tantly 
stressing the need for a ' special re lationship between the three parties 
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in resistance to impe rialism ' .  S ti ll ,  old atti tudes did survive to 
some extent . I n  June 1 9 5 2 , the Commi ttee of Vie t  Minh Cadres in 
Kampuchea observed that ' the Khme r People ' s  Party i s  not the vanguard 
o f  the working c lass , but the vanguard party o f  the nation . . .  ' .  Thi s  
formulation indi cate s that the Vie tnamese Party sti ll saw the Marxi st­
Lenini s t  status of i ts Kampuchean counterpart as relative ly low .
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The resolutions o f  the Geneva Conference on I ndochina i n  1954 
dealt a severe blow to the Kampuchean communi sts . Whi le the Vietnamese 
and Lao partie s were conceded secure areas of terri tory , the Kampucheans 
were not even admi tted to the Conference . As a result o f  i t ,  they 
were obliged to go into e xi le , or take their chance s wi th Sihanouk's 
government whi ch had been conceded total control o f  Kampuchean terri tory . 
This delibe rate tactical concession by the socialist camp would , i t  
was hoped , lay the basi s  for greate r revolutionary gains in the long 
term by attempting to consolidate only what was considered possible 
in the short term . But to many i n  the Kampuchcan Communist Party i t  
was nothing short o f  a sell-out . 
The next s i x  years were di sastrous for the Kampuchean People ' s  
Party . Cadre s e xposed to government repre ssion suffered a simi lar 
fate to that of the revolutionaries in South Vietnam , who were also 
di sarmed and exposed to Diem ' s  repression . Despi te signi fi cant 
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popular support , the Party was decimated i n  the 1955  and 19 58  elections 
as a result of police intimidation of voters , haras sment of candidates ,  
break -up o f  poli ti cal rallies , impri sonment o f  party members and party 
candidates ,  and censorship o f  newspapers ,
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in the fac e o f  al l of which 
the party had been di sarmed , and had no terri tory in which to take 
re fuge . Sti l l , in 1 9 5 5 , one Khmer Party candidate drew 2 5% o f  the 
vote in his e lectorate even though he had spent the enti re campaign 
period i n  gaol . 
Sihanouk ' s  conso lidation o f  power and elimination o f  opposition 
parties by 195 8  heralded an even fiercer campai gn of repre ssion o f  
the revolutionaries. The edi tor o f  the party newspaper was assassinated 
in full public view outside a mi li tary barracks in Phnom Penh in that 
year . In the same year , according to Pol Pot , 9 0% of the party ' s  
rural cadre was also wiped out .
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In September 196 0 , the party secretly 
called i ts first congre ss to s tudy and analyse the cri ti cal si tuation. 
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The deci sion was made at the 1960 congress to adopt a new 
politi cal strategy of de termined se l f-reliance , wi thout depending 
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on the support o f  the socialist camp , whi ch i n  practi ce meant the 
Vietnamese party . Son Ngoc Minh , the party leader most fai thful to 
the Vie tname se line , was removed from hi s post . Also , given the 
di sastrous results o f  dependence upon parliamentary means o f  struggle 
wi thout the prote ction o f  armed force , the party decided to prepare 
for armed insurrection against the feudalist regime and i ts imperialist 
backers , based in the rural areas . Meanwhi le the Vi etnamese 
communi sts were engaged in a li fe-and-death struggle with American 
imperiali sm . I t  was important to them that Kampuchea not be used 
as a base from whi ch they could be attacked in the rear . Thus , they 
supported Prince Sihanouk ' s  policy o f  neutrali ty in the conflict , 
despi te his repression o f  communism at home . I t  i s  obvious that 
Americ an impe riali sm had p laced the Vietnamese party in a dilenuna 
wi th regard to Kampuchea . Thi s  di lemma could not be reso lve d  in a 
manner sati s factory to both the Kampuchean and Vietnamese parties , 
and there i s  li ttle reason to expe c t  the Vietnamese to have sacri fi ced 
much for the Kampuchean party , espe cially a fter it had adopted i ts 
own independent line . 
The overthrow o f  Prince Sihanouk i n  1970  c re ated a new 
si tuation . Lon Nol ' s  new alliance with the Uni ted State s  and hi s 
attacks on Vie tnamese conununi st sanctuaries threatened the Vietname se 
revolution , opening the way for close cooperation between the 
Vi etnamese and Kampuchean parties in re sisting the Phnom Penh regime . 
S ti l l , the aims o f  the two parties i n  Kampuchea remained di ffe rent . 
The Vietnamese forces wanted freedom from harassment so they could 
pursue their attacks on the Americans in Vietnam , and were prepared 
to settle for Prince S ihanouk ' s  return to power in Kampuchea , or 
even j ust the incapacitation o f  the Lon Nol army in the border areas . 
On the other hand , the aim o f  the Kampuchean party was a peasant 
revolution in Kampuchea that would lay the bas i s  fo r a sel f-re liant 
and soci alist e conomy . Although not mutually exc lusive , the aims o f  
the two parties were thus independe n t  and a t  times clashed. 
I t  should be poi nted out that despite the se clashe s and rivalries 
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there was substantial cooperation between the two parties , particularly 
after the Indochina People's Sununit Conference of April 19 70 in 
southern China. This largely came to an end after the signing of the 
Paris Peace .P .. greement on Vietnam in early 197 3 .  Although it did not 
achieve a ceasefire , the agreement did release large numbers of US 
bombers formerly operating over Vietnam for use against the Kampuchean 
revolutionary army . In the six months to August 197 3 ,  about 2 0 0 , 000 
Karnpucheans were killed or wounded in one of the most intensive 
bombing campaigns of the war . While this was going on , however , 
the Vietnamese were urging the Kampucheans to negotiate with Lon Nol, 
and sca ling down their arms supplies to the Kampucheans , as part of 
their implementation of the Paris agreement . There seems little doubt 
that the Kampucheans , who had always refused to negotiate with Lon 
Nol and who now had to suffer the consequences of the Vietnamese 
entering into a peace agreement with Thieu , saw this as another sell­
out by the Vietnamese party . Reports of serious clashes , particularly 
over arms supplies , date from 197 3 .  
The 'Indochina. Federa tion ' 
Although the Vietnamese have not raised any proposals for an 
' Indochina Federation' since the dissolution of the ICP in 19 51 , there 
is little doubt that they would like more influence in Phnom Penh than 
the Kampuchean party as it is constructed presently is prepared to allow . 
According to Nayan Chanda: 'Observers in Hanoi believe that Indochina 
solidarity is an article of faith with Hanoi in order that it can play 
the vanguard role in Southeast Asia1•
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Whether that's true or not, 
according to one Vietnamese official also quoted by Nayan Chanda: 'We 
insist on a special relationship because there is not another example 
in history of such a relationship , as when two people who have shared 
each grain of rice, every bullet, suffering and victory ' .  
Phnom Penh's view is that it wants a 'normal relationship' 
with Vietnam rather than a 'special relationship' , which has been defined 
by Phnom Penh radio: 'A "special friendship" and "special solidarity" 
• I 9 is a friendship without a frontier, a solidarity without a frontier . 
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Sea border 
The sea border i s , I think a fairly importan t  factor in the 
dispute . 
Although no fighting has taken place on the seas or i slands 
that make up the maritime fronti er between the two countries s ince June 
19 7 5 , there are indications that serious di sagreements over the sea 
border are behind the fai lure to arrive at a reconci liation by thi s 
stage . I t  i s  worth noting that thi s di spute i s  extreme ly important 
for Kampuchea , not only because there are ' strong possibi l i ties o f  
finding oi l and natural gas ' in  the di sputed seabed ,  but also because 
most o f  Kampuchea ' s  ' avai lable continental shel f  i s  in  di spute wi th 
e i ther Vi etnam or Thai land , whereas those two countries have large 
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areas of continental shelf  whe re their sove reignty i s  unchallenged ' .  
In 1966 , border negotiations took place between S ihanouk ' s  
government ,  and the Vie tnamese NLF and DRV . As a re sult the Vietnamese 
communi sts agreed to recognise i s lands north of the Br(vi { line � drawn 
by the Governor-General of French Indochina i n  1939  �as Kampuchean. 
Given thi s concession , the Vie tnamese re fusal to recognize the line 
as an i nternational boundary , but simply a line delineating 
' admini strative and police j urisdiction ' ,  must have seemed academi c 
to the Kampucheans . In 1970  Vietnam publi shed its own di fferent 
version of the sea border ( Vie tnamese Studies, 28 ) , although i ts 
1 9 7 8  posi tion was that no agreement was reached during the 1966 
negotiations . In May 1976 the Vietname se ' attempted to reconsider 
the frontier of Kampuchea-Vietnam , particularly the mari time frontier , 
introducing plans o f  annexation o f  a big part of the seas o f  Kampuchea' , 
the Kampucheans regarded thi s as a breach of the agreement ( although 
in 1966 there i s  no evidence that a sea border agreement had been 
) 
. . 1 1  
reached and broke off  the negotiations . 
The Vie tnamesP �oree that they have changed their atti tude to 
the sea border ,  from one of de facto recogni tion o f  the Brevie' line as 
the frontier , since 1 966 . Nayan Chanda reported a Vie tnamese official as 
saying to him in 1 9 7 7 : ' At the time we agreed to the Br�vie' line we 
were not aware o f  the problems o f  terri torial waters , continental she l f , 
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etc � those new phenomena ' .  
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Revealing the importance it attaches to the offshore dispute , 
in mid-197 7  Vietnam assigned its chief delegate to the Law of the Sea 
Conference.,to the Embassy in Phnom Penh . This was just after claiming 
a 200-mile offshore economic zone in May 197 7  which , combined with newly 
announced claims by Thailand , would have left Kampuchea in control of 
only a narrow triangle of the sea and seabed off its coast . Apparently 
the Kampucheans first openly named the Vietnamese as an adversary when 
Vietnam 's foreign minister was signing j oint communiques with Indonesia , 
and , pointedly , Thailand , pledging peaceful negotiations over maritime 
disputes . 
Resis tance movements 
In terms of resistance movements along the border areas which 
might be causing misunderstanding , the most important one I think is 
an area where there is a substantial population of ethnic Khmers living 
inside Vietnam and along the border , the Triton and Tinh Bien districts 
of Vietnam between Hatien and Chaudoc . According to a French map printed 
in 1949 and a Saigon government map printed in 197 2 ,  the population of 
13 these districts is almost totally Khmer . In this area alone in May 
1977 , 40% of all Vietnamese civilian casualties along the entire border 
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in 1977 were suffered , and throughout January 1978 , during the large 
scale fighting, there were 'persistent reports of Vietnamese setbacks ' 
in this area .
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The particular reasons for this are still obscure , 
although some pointers are available . 
According to ethnic Khmer defectors whose accounts were broadcast 
over Phnom Penh Radio in January 1978 , all was not well among the 700 , 000 
or more ethnic Khmers who live in Vietnam 's Mekong Delta , known to them 
as Kampuchea Krom , or Lower Kampuchea . They said on the Phnom Penh radio 
that the CIA-connected 'KKK', or 'movement of struggle of the Khmers 
of Kampuchea Krom ' , was still a.cti ve , and in April 19 76 even 'became 
powerful against the Vietnamese authorities' . Based in the 'Seven 
Mountains ' area of Triton and Tinh Bien districts , the movement engaged 
in armed resistance against the Vietnamese communists . Independent 
refugee sources reported a rebel attack on a Vietnamese border artillery 
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po st in the area on May 5 ,  1977, in whi ch a number of arti llery piece s  
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were destroyed . Thi s  attack was not listed in the comprehensive list 
o f  alleged border i ncursions carried out by the Kampucheans ,  so  i t  
would appear to have been the work of the KKK . However , i n  November 
1977 the KKK suffered succe ssive de feats , i ts leader was ki lled in action , 
' and the libe ration army was all scattered ' .  Four surviving members 
of its leadership were then enli sted by the Vietname se for e spionage 
work in Kampuchea , and they al l defe c ted to Kampuchea in December 1977. 
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Most recently a maj or c lash took p lace in thi s  area on June 16, 1978. 
Border de limi ta tion and demarcation 
In thei r  statement o f  January 20, 1978, the Vi etnamese claimed 
that Kan�uchea ' s  o f fi cial map o f  its frontiers , published in 1977, 
' does not conform to the facts o f  hi story ' . Examination o f  the map 
reveals two di sce rnible departure s from past maps o f  the border between 
the two countries . One is the mari time border , di scus sed above . 
The other i s  what previous maps have depicted as a box-l ike 
salient of Vie tnam ' s  northern Tay Ninh province that j uts into Kampuchea ' s  
Kompong Cham province . Five di ffe rent maps o f  the border give thi s 
box di fferent shape s .  Al l di sagree on the relationship o f  the boundary 
line to a stream in the area , although they all agree that the border 
does no t fol low the stream . This i s  important because French colonial 
authori ti es apparently never put into p lace one of the only two markers 
intended to demarcate the bou;-�ary o f  this box-like salient . 
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Some 
of the map s also show a number of vil lages wi th Khmer name s j ust inside 
Vietnamese terri tory . Such a vi llage apparently accounts for at least 
one of the di fference s in the shape of the salient on the various maps . 
The high percentage of ethnic Khmer among the population of the area , 
recorded in the 1949 and 1972 maps men tioned above , complicate s the 
issue furthe r .  Fol lowing the 1966 negotiations , the Vietnamese publicly 
recognized Kampuchean sovereignty ove r Khmer vi l lage s in ambiguous 
border zones in that same se ction o f  the border . 
Kampuchean national united front and communist maps , printed 
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since 1970 but possibly showing the same boundaries as one printed by 
Sihanouk's government in 1 969 , all show the salient as Kampuchean 
territory . Kampuchean belief that this defined section of land is 
clearly theirs may account for the high number of Vietnamese civilian 
casualties (up to 50% of the total civilian casualties along the 
entire border in 1977) sustained in this precise area , which the 
Vietnamese claim the Kampuchean forces have attacked 'for occupation 
purposes' , as distinct from the 'annihilation purposes' they attribute 
to Kampuchean attacks on Vietnam military at other points along the 
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border. 
A Vietnamese map of local Kampuchean attacks indicates attempts 
to wrest this box-like salient from Vietnamese control . The area was on0 
of the major Vietnamese sanctuaries during the anti-American war. It 
appears that Vietnam called its troops back home from sanctuaries in 
Kampuchea after the war ended , but not immediately; some Vietnamese 
troops di�� stay for an unknown period in another section of the country . 
More serious to the Karnpucheans , however , was the settlement in this 
area of Vietnamese civilians , refugees who had fled the war in their 
country but possibly did not return there when it ended . That is 
currently what the Kampucheans claim . Added to this is the possibility 
of more recent settlement of former urban dwellers into New Economic 
Zones set up in the area by the Vietnamese government since 1975. 
This raises the very sensitive issue of Kampuchea's territorial 
survival , against settler expansionism , as they see it . In their 
view it was by this means that their country was nearly wiped off the 
map (as was neighbouring Champa) by Vietnam and Thailand in the nineteenth 
century , and then carved up by Thailand in World War II . Kampuchea's 
precarious fate is a question that dominates Khmer nationalism . 
There is a map published by Paul Hamlyn in the mid-1970s , which 
shows a large area of Kampuchea as part of Thailand , including Battambang; 
it is obviously the border which was temporarily taken by the Thais 
in World War II. That was thirty years ago . Since April 1978 the Khmer 
leaders have talked explicitly about 'defending the race of Kampuchea' , 
from Vietnam's plans 'to swallow all of Kampuchea and eliminate its 
race at the end of the determined period'; 'defending the national 
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digni ty and the race o f  Kampuchea to as sure its continued survival ' .  
The Khmer people , they say , ' do not want the soul of the nation o f  
Kampuchea extingui shed ' ,  or i ts race t o  be eliminated . They want the 
right to di spose and decide ' by ourselves our own destiny , and the 
race o f  Kampuchea to be everlasting ' .  
I n  thi s  connection i t  seems that the exi stence of a border 
di spute i s , i ronical ly enough , an important reason why Kampuchea has 
fai led as yet to respond to Vie tnamese calls  for negotiation . Agreements 
in 1966-67 be tween Vietnamese and the Kampuchean government produced 
statements by the Vi etnamese that they recognized and undertook to 
respect ' the territorial integrity o f  Kampuchea wi thin its pre sent 
frontiers ' .  These were unilateral s tatements ( Kampuchea did not 
recognise Vie tnam ' s  frontiers ) in  return for which Kampuchea agreed 
to permanently shelve al l i ts claims on ' lost terri tories ' such as 
the Mekong De lta , and smaller tracts of land i llegally trans ferred 
to Vietnam by the French b�tween 1 8 7 0  and 1914 .  
Thi s  meant that Kampuchea now formally conside red i ts borders 
inviolable , immutable and intangible , i . e . , that the borders can 
neve r  be ' touched ' by negotiations for further readj ustments . Thi s  
had the effect of re serving Kampuchea ' s  right t o  resolve ( in i ts 
favour ) any ambi guity in the delineation o f  the frontiers . These 
ambi gui ties would necessari ly be mi nor ( the box- like salient of Tay 
Ninh province seems a typical case ) because the French de lineation in 
most cases was qui te clear . But the importance to Kampuchea of thi s  
right i s  unque stionable , a s  one government edi toriali s t  explained i n  
1969, during the Sihanouk period: 
Mos t  foreign governments consider that Kampuchea i s  not 
very sane because she grants an importance which they lack 
to "several l i ttle uninhabi ted i s lets" , to several acre s 
o f  forest , and even to some old stone s ( Preah Vihear ) .  Why 
not abandon these to those who want them , for i s  thi s not the 
pri ce , at minimal cost ,  of ree stabli shing good relations with 
neighbours? The Thai s and the Vietnamese . . .  never cease to 
avow their good intentions towards Kampuchea ,  thei r  de sire to 
settle once and for all thi s frontier problem in a friendly 
spirit . . . (Othe rs ) cannot unders tand why Kampuchea re fuse s 
to take the broad view . . .  The point at i s sue i s  not the 
value o f  the land claimed but much more . In Saigon as in 
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Bangkok , ( they )  would only consider the most minimum 
sati s faction resulting from these claims as a sign that 
Kampuchea i s  beginning to " unbend" .. . .  I t  i s  certain that 
the least surrender o f  a parcel o f  national land would 
lead to a serious psychological shock to the Khmers as 
well as a sense of impotence towards the expansionist 
aims o f  her nei ghbours . Conversely , the Siamese and 
the Vie tnamese would draw the conclusion that Kampuchea i s  
the "sick man" o f  Southeast Asia and that they are chosen 
to take over her he ritage . . . . The tradi tional me thod 
used by the Court of Annam . . . i s  to "pick away" wi thout 
let-up . The actual claims are "modest and reasonable" 
but we know from expe rience that methods begun in this 
manner lead inevitably to the annexation of the areas , 
then the provinces and eventually o f  all the left bank of 
the Mekong . . . .  
But Kampuchea . . .  does not intend to fall into her neighbours ' 
trap nor wi ll she be the dupe o f  diplomati c  by-play . The 
actual frontie r  i tse l f  i s  the Khmers ' last line o f  
resistance . . . .  To accept proposals t o  negotiate
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• .  would 
be a tacit acknowle dgement of eventual defeat . . •
. 
The Kampucheans seem to fee l  that the Vietnamese would do 
the same in 1978 . At any rate , i t  evi dent that the Kampucheans 
regard the frontiers as non-negotiable when they broke off  the 1976 
negotiations i n  Phnom Penh as soon as i t  was clear that the Vietnamese 
wanted to ' redraw ' the mari time border . 
Kampuchea broke off diplomatic re lations wi th Vie tnam on December 
3 1 , 1 9 7 7 . On that day , Vietnam , Laos , and Thai land e stabli shed an 
' interim ' Mekong Development P ro j ec t  Committee , to exploi t the rive r ' s  
enormous hydroelectric and i rrigation potential . Kampuchea re fused 
to j oin thi s  commi ttee and possib ly even sees the pro j ect as a severe 
threat to i ts independence . I n  1 9 7 2  a World Bank review o f  Mekong 
deve lopment plans pointed out that the planned construction of two 
big dams , one at S tung Treng i n  Kampuchea , would di splace 700 , 000  
Khmer and ethni c  Lao peasants . The main bene fits , however ,  would 
accrue to Saigon and Bangkok , the review noted . It reportedly went 
on: ' Wi th bo th Vi etnam and Thai land relying on installations deep 
inside Kampuchea , the Kampuchean leaders would face the choice o f  
serving their rivals ' interests � or facing the mi li tary and political 
consequences i f  they did not • .2 1  
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In conclusion , there are many signi fi cant di f fe rences between 
the governments o f  Kampuchea and Vie tnam � hi storical , terri torial , 
and ideological . What may be unclear i s  whether these di fferences 
themse lves are fundamental , or whet-her other fac tors have i ntervened 
to turn ' contradi ctions among the people ' into ' antagonistic 
contradic tions ' .  
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THE ' TWO - L I NES ' CONF L I C T  IN 
THE KHME R REVOLUT I ON 
C a r ly le Thay e r  
I t  i s  my contention that since at least the mid-1950s , the 
Khmer revolutionary movement has been spl i t  into two camps (or 
factions ) .  The leadership of the se camps di sagree about how to conduct 
revolution i n  Cambodia and about the role and extent of Vietname se 
conununi st assi stance. In the time allotted to me , I would like to 
trace the ' two line struggle ' through four historically di sti nct 
periods : ( 1 )  1948-1954 ;  ( 2 )  1954- 196 3 ;  ( 3 ) 196 3 - 19 7 0  and (4 ) 1970-
197 5. 
Period one, 1 9 48- 1 9 54 : 1 I n  1 948 the Conununi st Viet-Minh Front 
e xpanded operations into Cambodi a. Nguyen Thanh Son , a member o f  the 
Nam Bo Regional Conuni ttee , was given the task o f  organi zing resources 
in Cambodia to support the war e ffort in southern Vi etnam ( i. e . ,  Nam 
Bo ) .  Between 1948 and 1951  bases were establi shed , supply lines were 
created and contro l placed ove r  local transport. Taxes were levied 
on Vie tnamese working on rubber plantations , fi shermen and othe r 
Vietnamese resi dents ( Vie t kieu ) in Cambodia. I n  1 9 5 1 , 1 5 0  mi l lion 
piastre s was col lected , an amount equivalent to one-half  the Cambodian 
budget and three times the budget ' s  expendi ture on national defence . 
The Khmer revolutionary movement came into promi nence in April 
1950  when a Congress of People ' s  Repre sentatives met and establi shed 
a Committee of Liberation headed by Son Ngoc Minh. The Conuni ttee 
spa rked mi li tary operations against the French. Convoys were ambushed 
and French admi ni stration di srupted. By the time the siege at Dien 
Bien Phu was drawi ng to a close , revolutionary forces in Cambodia he ld 
down a French force four time s the i r  s i ze . 
In 1 9 5 1  the Indochinese Conununi st Party was spli t  into three 
national se ctions. A Khmer People ' s  Revolutionary Party ( KPRP )  emerged 
alongside the Lao People ' s  Revolutionary Party and the Vietnam Workers ' 
Party ( VWP ) .  I t  was at thi s  time that the i dea of an ' Indochinese 
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Federation' was first expressed , I might add that the preconditions 
for this federation were the success of the revolutionary movements 
in each of the three countries comprising French Indochina and mutual 
2 
consent. (Dennis Duncanson has averred , however , that the Chinese 
text of the VWP's 1951 political programme failed to mention the second 
condition. ) 
During the period 195 2-5 3 ,  the forces of anti-French Khmer 
nationalism were most forcefully represented by Son Ngoc Thanh's Khmer 
Issarak (with whom the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party sought to 
cooperate) and by Norodom Sihanouk himself who , in 1953 , launched a 
successful Crusade for Independence. Sihanouk's success placed the 
Khmer revolutionary movement in something of a dilemma. Sometime in 
late 195 3/early 1954 Pol Pot and Ieng Sary returned from France where 
they had been studying . Touch Samit replaced Son Ngoc Minh as head 
of the KP RK .  Minh left Cambodia and joined Vo Nguyen Giap at his 
headquarters during the siege of Dien Bien Phu . Minh remained there 
until after the Geneva conference. 
While many specific details remain obscure , the foregoing 
evidence points to the emergence of 'two lines' within the Khmer 
revolutionary movement. One line has since become identified with 
Pol Pot. It favoured the overthrow of Sihanouk (i. e . , anti-feudalism) 
as an immediate objective. It also opposed tying the fortunes of the 
KPRP to events in Vietnam and Laos. This group was outraged by the 
results of the 1954 Geneva Conference which witnessed the exclusion 
of representatives of the Khmer revolutionary movement. 
The second line to emerge � the dominant line until 1963 � 
favoured close cooperation with revolutionaries in Vietnam. This 
meant support for Sihanouk externally , while adopting a legal united 
front strategy internally. The instrument of this policy was the 
Pracheachon or People's Party which was expected to radicalize domestic 
Cambodian politics. The 1954 Geneva Conference thus marked a water­
shed for both camps. Although the numbers are in dispute , hundreds 
of Khmer revolutionaries regrouped in northern Vietnam; others 
dispersed inside Cambodia or crossed over into Vietnam. Overall the 
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enti re Khmer revolutionary movement was e s timated to number 
around 4 , 000 . 
Period two, 1 9 54- 1 9 63 :  Period one witne ssed the creation of 
a Khmer revolutionary movement under the tute lage o f  Vietnamese 
communists . I ts ope rations were an adj unct to the war in nei ghbouring 
Vietnam . During period two , the ' pro-Vietname se ' leadership of the 
KPRP would remain in control . At the same time , the minori ty faction 
would grow in strength as the policy of peace ful struggle under 
Sihanouk ' s  government proved increasingly di fficult . 
During the 195 4- 6 3  period the Democratic Republic o f  Vietnam , 
alo ng wi th other members o f  the soc ialist camp , backed an increasingly 
neutralist Sihanouk . After the Prince ' s  vi s i t  to China in 19 56 , for 
example , he extended diplomatic recogn i tion to the People ' s  Republic . 
Sihanouk ' s  external policies caused disquiet in Bangkok and Saigon . 
The latter instigated a series  o f  border clashes and even attemp ted 
a coup against the former King . 
3 
I nternal ly , however , a contradic tion emerged between pursuing 
the KPRP ' s  policy of supporting Sihanouk in power (a policy supported 
by the Vietnamese communists for obvious reasons ) and in continuing 
a domestic policy of legal struggle . I n  195 5 ,  for e xample , the 
P racheachon was unsucce s s ful in the national elections . The 
P.�acheachcn ' s  le fti s t  propaganda soon attracted repression by S ihanouk . 
Whi le the KPRP grappled wi th thi s contradiction , the pro-Vietname se 
faction remained in control ; i roni cally , Vie tname se aid dec lined , 
as Hanoi was unwilling to assist the KPRP in opposing Sihanouk when 
Hanoi could reap much greater bene fits by supporting Sihanouk ' s  anti -
Western neutrali sm .  
I n  19 5 7 , i n  response to thi s conundrum , the KPRP set up a 
commi ttee to review the Party ' s  line . Thi s  committee reported back 
that events were simi lar to those i n  southern Vietnam where members 
o f  the Nam Bo Regional Commi ttee were advocating to the Vietnam Workers ' 
Party Central Commi ttee a return to armed violence .  
2 3  
Events in Cambodia during the period 1958-6 3 are murky. In 
September 1960 the VWP held its Third National Congress . At that time 
the VWP decided to ratify as party policy the completion of the nationa l 
democratic revolution in the South (i . e . , national liberation) . Later 
that same month , the Khmer Communist Party (KCP) was established . It 
advocated a two-pronged strategy of ( 1 )  national liberation and (2) 
anti-feudalism (class warfare) . Thus , not surprisingly , the years 
196 2 - 6 3  witnessed a divergence of policy between the KCP and the VWP 
over whether or not to back Sihanouk. 
In 196 2 , after the death of the KCP's secretary , Pol Pot was 
appointed interim secretary . At the KCP's Second Congress a year 
later , P�l Pot was made permanent secretary. This leadership change 
gave birth to a new line , one direc ted at attacking the forces of 
Cambodian feudalism � the overthrow of Sihanouk . There can be little 
doubt that this line was diametrically opposed to that of the VWP and 
its band of collaborators in the KCP apparatus . In 196 3 ,  for example , 
Sihanouk cut off all US aid to Cambodia , an act which seemingly 
aligned his country with Vietnam against American imperialism. 
Period three, 1 9 63- 1 9 7 0 :  Period three saw the triumph of the 
Pol Pot line . Efforts were undertaken in 196 3-66 to build up strength 
in the countryside . The events of the 196 7 Samlaut Rebellion need 
further study as it is unclear whether local events overtook the KCP's 
internal policy; but what is important is that in the end the KCP 
decided to push armed struqqle against Sihanouk. Nevertheless , the KCP 
remained a relatively small organization which received little or no 
foreign assistance. Its legal arm , the Pracheachon , was completely 
repressed in 1966 . Thus , by 196 7 both as a result of Sihanouk's 
repression and as a result of a change in the KCP's line , rebellion 
began to sputter across the rural areas of Cambodia. 
Externally , period three witnessed a deterioration in relations 
between Sihanouk and the Vietnamese communists . During the period 
October-December 1964 , for example , Sihanouk tried to obtain agreement 
with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam concerning Cambodia's boundaries. 
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Complete acceptance o f  Cambodia ' s  frontiers foundered over c laims 
to the Hai Tac and Tho Chu i slands . During 1965  the Vie tnamese 
communi sts began to enlarge and expand thei r  sanctuaries in north­
eastern Cambodia .  Although Vietname se communist pre sence was tolerated 
ini tial ly , the expansion in size and area occupied soon caused alarm 
in Phnom Penh . No doubt S ihanouk was concerned about his neighbour ' s  
i ntentions when he learned that Pol Pot , en route to Peking , had 
stopped ove r  in Hanoi to hold talks wi th Cambodian veterans and , equal ly 
important ,  to establi sh formal liai son wi th the VWP ' s  Central Commi ttee . 
The ever-increasing prese nce of Vietnamese communists on Cambodian 
soi l ( estimated i n  1968 at 4 5 , 000 ) gravely upset Sihanouk . During 1968-
69 he launched an economic drive against the intruders and , in  1969 , 
agreed to the unpublici zed American bombing o f  sanctuary areas . 
Meanwhi le , Pol Pot and the KCP were i ntensi fying thei r  efforts to 
bring down the Sihanouk regime . No doubt the Vie tnamese communists 
were spared some harsh policy decisions in March o f  1970 when a right­
wing coup toppled Sihanouk from powe r . With the Prince ' s  downfal l 
the way was n:::iw open for the KCP and the VWP to cooperate . 
Period four, 1 9 70- 1 9 ? 5 :  The March 1 9 7 0  coup provided the VWP 
wi th an unexpected dividend : an outraged anti -Ame rican Sihanouk wi l ling 
to cooperate with the Vietnamese communi sts . Vietnamese leaders such 
as Pham Van Dong and Pham Hung pressed the KCP leadership to adopt a 
uni ted front , headed by Sihanouk , as the main strategy o f  opposing 
the Lon Nol regime . Thi s marriage of convenience between the KCP 
and the Khmer Rumdoah (pro-Sihanouk nationalists ) was not without i ts 
ironi es . S ihanouk , i t  should be recalled , had been quite active prior 
to 1970  in  attempting to repre ss the KCP � 
After the formation o f  the Royal Government of  a National Uni ted 
Kampuchea ( GRUNK) in Apri l 1970 , and after a c ongre ss of I ndochinese 
Peoples held i n  Chi na , Khmer ve terans l iving in Hanoi began to return 
to Cambodia to take part in the struggle there . Chinese and Vietname se 
aid � the first real external assi stance � was now sent ove rland 
down the Ho Chi Minh Trai l to he lp the Cambodian Liberation Army . 
Despi te the new cooperation between Khmer and Vietname se revolutionaries , 
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relations deteriorated i n  the latter part o f  period four as the former 
grew in strength . 
Period four may be broken down into three phases .  The first 
phase , March 1 9 7 0  to mid-1971 , wi tnessed a marriage o f  convenience 
between the Khmer Rumdoah and the Khmer Krahom (KCP ) . Thei r  mutual 
antipathy to the Lon Nol regime was about the only area o f  agreement 
between them . The chart below summarizes the salient di fferences :  
Khmer Rumdoah 
Royalist , pro-Sihanouk 
Re spect religion , maintain 
tradition 
Retain traditional land 
holdings 
Full cooperation with Vietnamese 
communists 
Khmer Krahom 
Communist , anti -monarchy 
Repress Buddhism ,  overturn 
tradi tion 
Confiscate land , collectivi ze 
agriculture 
Anti -Vietnamese ; force them 
to leave Cambodia 
During thi s phase the Vietnamese communists seconded political 
and mi l i tary cadre s to help the Khmer revolutionaries establish the 
National Uni ted Front o f  Kampuchea (NUFK) at vi llage and hamlet level . 
The second phase o f  period four may be dated from late 1 9 7 1  unti l 
early 197 3 .  I t  was characteri zed by the KCP ' s  attempt to free itse l f  
o f  Vie tnamese communist control . As the KCP came to dominate NUFK 
at al l levels , i t  began to adopt a programme of radical dome stic 
change . New , tougher cadre s rep laced those previously in authori ty 
who were now purged . Allegiance to S ihanouk was curtai led and then 
abandoned . In 1 9 7 2  the new cadres ,  described by one wri ter , 4 as 
' fanati cal outside rs ' ,  began the uprooting and relocation o f  vil lagers 
in the liberated zones . They began to stre ss theme s of sel f-reliance 
such as ' Cambodia for the Cambodi ans ' .  The Vi etname se insi stance on 
maintai ning the uni ted front struc ture wi th Sihanouk as i ts head 
caused them to clash wi th the KCP . Scattered fighting between the 
Cambodian Liberation Army and the Vie tnamese troops/Khmer Blancs
5 
soon 
re sulted . 
The third phase o f  period four followed the signing o f  the 
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam i n  
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January 197 3 .  As is well known , the KCP resisted negotiations and 
as a consequence bore the full brunt of American bombing until the US  
Congress legislated against it in August 197 3 .  Beginning in the spring 
of that year ( 19 7 3) the KCP entered a period of accelerated communization . 
New KCP cadres began to operate at district level for the first time . 
Village relocation was accelerated , especially after southern Cambodia 
was liberated . During April-May 197 3 ,  the campaign to denigrate 
Sihanouk went into high gear . It was accompanied by the in-depth purge 
of royalists within the NUFK structure as well as by a campaign to 
drive monks from their temples . Village-level demonstrations were 
held against the presence of Vietnamese troops on Cambodian territory . 
In the end , the Khiner Rumdoah were broken as an effective 
force . In April 1974 this change in the balance of forces was clearly 
signalled when Khieu Samphan went on an eleven-nation tour . In Peking 
he was received by Mao himself . The NUFK was clearly in the hands of 
the KCP . Assistance from Vietnam dwindled , as might be expected . 
Vietnamese troops were increasingly drawn back into the frontier region 
although reports in late 197 3  indicated that clashes with the Cambodian 
Liberation Army were continuing . 
During 1974 preparations were set in train for the final 
offensive against the Lon Nol regime as 5 0 , 000  Khmers were mobilized 
by the KCP. Their offensive succeeded on April 17 , 197 5 when Phnom 
Penh was captured . 
Conclusion : the pres ent, 1 9 7 5- 1 9 78 .  I would like to end my 
remarks by making brief comments on several aspects of the contemporary 
relationship between Kampuchea and Vietnam that might help to explain 
the present enmity . 
i )  Treatment of Vietnamese in Cambodia : n o  doubt the VCP is 
angered by the treatment accorded overseas Vietnamese ( Vi e t  kieu ) 
by the Pol Pot regime. Nearly 5 0 , 000  have been forced to 
abandon their homes and livelihoods to flee to Vietnam . 
ii) The KCP's internal line : Hanoi i s  likewise dismayed at the 
internal line adopted by the KCP , especially its stress on 
violence . 
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i ii} Anti -Pol Pot resi stance : Kampuchea today appears fragmented 
into mi l i tary regions. It may be premature to apply the labe l 
' warlordi sm ' , but inte rnal di s sension appears ri fe . I t  i s  
clear , gi ven the ' two line thesi s '  advanced above , that the 
VCP is backi ng an anti -Pol Pot resi s tance movement . 
i v )  Other resistance groups : since the liberation o f  Phnom Penh 
and Saigon in 1 9 7 5 , various anti -communist groups have sprung 
into exi stence . The present regime in Vietnam faces armed 
opposition by ex-ARVN ( Army of the Republic of Vietnam) 
soldiers , Catho lics , FULRO (highlanders ) di ssi den ts ! and Hoa Hao 
( r.eligious sect) . No doubt the operation of these groups , 
some of whom are active along the common border ,  has been an 
i rri tan t . Phnom Penh encouragement and support for one or 
more o f  these groups cannot be ruled out . 
v) Chinese aid : Vietnam i s  concerned about Phnom Penh ' s pro-Peking 
forei gn poli cy .  No doubt Hanoi compares and contrasts the 
$ 1  bill ion in aid given to Kampuchea with China ' s parsimonious 
aid towards Vietnam in the period fol lowing liberation , aid 
whi ch has now been completely halted . 
vi) Sanctuary : i t  seems clear that Vietname se forces continue to 
occupy areas o f  Cambodia once used as sanctuarie s . Whe ther or 
not the Vietnamese fee l  they have a right to these p lace s , i t  
i s  clear that the ultra-nationali st regime in Phnom Penh finds 
the situation intolerable . 
vii )  Special relationship vs . Indochina Federation :  one constant 
re frain in Kampuchean propaganda i s  that Vietnam i s  trying to 
force Cambodia into some sort o f  Indochine se Federation . As 
I have observed , serious conside ration o f  this concept seems 
to have ended in 1 9 5 1 . Nevertheless , the Vietnamese have pressed 
for a ' special re lationship ' to whi ch the Kampucheans have 
replied , ' we want a normal not a special re lationship ' .  Laos 
and Vie tnam have embodied their ' special relationship ' in a 
2 5 -year treaty . In  practi ce , this has meant the stationing o f  
2 5 - 3 0 , 000  Vie tnamese troops in Laos to he lp in suppre ssing 
counte r-revolutionaries . 
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In con c l us ion , Vi e tnam has a legi timate se curi ty intere s t  i n  
what goe s on in  Cambodia . Thi s concern re lates not only to the 
exi stence o f  anti-communi st re sistance movements along the border area, 
but to whether or not the dome sti c policies o f  the Pol Pot regime make 
for dome sti c  stabi l i ty .  As I have tried to demonstrate above , there 
have been at least ' two l ines ' wi thin the Khmer revolutionary move­
ment , one pro-Vietnamese (or at least wi l ling to cooperate wi th the 
VCP ) . Given the dome sti c and forei gn pol i cies o f  the Pol Pot 
re gime , the re can be no doubt that the Vie tnamese wi ll  play upon one 
of the continuities o f  hi s tory and assi st opponents o f  the regime in 
Phnom Penh . 
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V I E TNAMES E  MOTIVAT I ONS 
Dav i d  Mar r  
A s  a hi storian I am in the uncomfortable position o f  feeling 
that we may be paying too much attention to the past . I would like 
to ti lt it a bi t to the present , and note the implications for the 
future i f  I can . After all , time s do change . Each generation should 
certainly know the past but be prepared to break wi th i t  as we ll . I 
think all three peoples , the Vietnamese , the Khmer and the Chinese 
are capable of doing thi s ,  given the right leadership and the right 
ci rcumstances .  
I want to deal here with four matters , all rather more general , 
perhaps , than some of the discussion so far . Fi rst , the re are the 
domestic Vietnamese factors , parti cularly e conomi c , whi ch influence 
her e xternal relations . S econdly , I have some comments on the 
Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict . Thirdly , there i s  the Vietnam-China dispute . 
And , final ly , I have some bri e f  thoughts on Vietnam ' s  regional and 
international perceptions , looking towards ASEAN and the world beyond . 
As regards dome stic factors , I do not think anyone can dispute 
that Vie tnam ' s main preoccupation since May 1 9 7 5  has been to move from 
a single - focus wartime mobi li zation to a multiple- focus programme of 
reconstruction and deve lopment . To put it mi ldly , thi s i s  not proving 
to be an easy transition . It  is worth li sting some of the reason s .  
First , i n  1 9 7 5  I think there was lack o f  preparation for post-war 
condi tions . Memoirs whi ch have come out since indicate that Vie tname se 
gene rals real ly did not expect to win completely in  South Vietnam in 
1975 , only to achieve a partial victory to be comple ted in 1976 , That 
meant that a number o f  very practical postwar planning e fforts were 
not ready when they were needed . Secondly , I think there has been a 
psychological let-down among Vietnamese after 3 0  years o f  intense 
struggle. Any human being can only take so much tension of the kind 
that the Vie tnamese have faced in both the north and the south over 
that period . Thi s i s  expressed i n  many di fferent ways in Vietnam 
today . 
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Thirdly , there are the deep marks in  th� south of the colonial 
and the neo-colonial past . The Vie tnamese communi s t  leadership has 
di ffi culty fathoming southern society , much less working out comprehensive 
solutions . I t  does reali ze , however ,  that true uni fi cation wi ll probably 
take several de cades . Fourthly , there i s  ample evidence of bureaucrati sm .  
Obviously thi s i s  not unique to the Vi etname se , although more than one 
Vietname se has complained that they got the worst o f  two traditions -
the Chinese Confucian hierarchy and the French official system . Perhaps 
thi s can be st be symboli zed in the constant use of rubber- stamps , 
and the requi rement that multiple copies be submi tted for j ust about 
everything . Thi s  i s  as evident among Vie tnamese communi s ts as i t  
ha s been among previous non-communist regime s in the south . There 
is constant evidence too o f  s lippage between top-level policy intent 
and bottom leve l implementation . 
A fifth reason i s  that clearly economi c assistance from the 
socia list countrie s  has been reduced , a nd there has been only modest 
re sponse from non-socialist countrie s .  The exceptions are Sweden , 
France , some UN agencies , the World Bank and the IMF . Of course there 
has been no he lp whatsoever from the Uni ted S tate s . A sixth reason 
for di ffi culty i s  the border problem , one of the things we are di sc�s sing 
today . And finally , most recently , there has been the departure of 
thousands of overseas Chinese , parti cularly from the north , highly 
ski lled people in many case s , including factory workers , miner s , 
s t.evedore s and fi shermen . Thi s has put a real dent i n  a number of 
proj ects in the north . 
Beyond thi s checklist I thi nk there ' s  a more fundamental prob l em .  
Winning a war has one se t o f  scienti fi c , politi cal and even arti stic 
imperati ves .  Winning a s truggle against poverty , i gnorance and di sease 
has a completely di ffe rent set o f  j mperatives . The top leaders of 
Vietnam , together since the early 1940s , certainly reali ze thi s , but 
they have not been able to formulate and di sseminate an alternative 
vi sion from that whi ch led Vietnam to vi ctory in 1 97 5 . Meanwhi le , 
most of the ordinary Vi etname se are wise enough to know tha t ,  un l ike 
a mi li tary vi c tory , the communist mi lleni um is not going to be 
3 1  
achieved on a certain day o f  a certain month o f  a certain year . 
Moderni zation i s  a proce s s , not a hill to be sei zed or an enemy 
divi sion sma shed . How doe s  one get millions o f  people commi tted to a 
proce s s ?  
Given current di f fi culties with Kampuchea and China it would be 
all too easy for Vietnam to revert to wartime imperatives ,  not only as 
regards its borders but also in determini ng how its  society and 
economy is o rgani zed . My reading o f  recent speeches and edi tori als 
indicate s that they have not done thi s  yet ,  an important element to 
keep in mind . The longer the armed conflict continue s , however , the 
more like ly i s  a reversion to a total war mentality . 
As concerns the Vie tnam-Kampuche a confl i ct speci fically , I would 
explain it four ways : ethnic-his tori cal animosities ;  inter-party 
relations ; di ffering perceptions o f  l i fe ; and the Sino-Soviet di spute . 
We have already had a fair amount o f  discussion on ethnic  and hi storical 
factors . I would simply want to emphas i ze further how the Khmer 
pos sess a profound fear and di strust o f  the Vietnamese stemming from 
real li fe , from a series of humi l iations and terri torial losses extending 
over many centuries . Most Khmer refuse to believe that Vietnam has 
no further terri torial ambitions , no matter what Vie tname se may say or 
do . On the other hand , ordinary Vie tnamese sti ll tend to look down 
on Khmers . When I was in Vie tnam in early 1 9 7 8  most people were stunned 
to read newspaper accounts of violent altercations be tween the two 
countrie s  having occurred only weeks a fter liberat ion in 1976 . Some 
expressed the opi nion that the Vie tnamese armed forces should settle 
the i ssue quickly , if necessary by marching into Phnom Penh . One middle 
level offi cial said ' of course , i f  we wanted to , we could take Phnom 
Penh in 24 hours ' .  Others ,  including some people on the street , were 
astute enough to reali ze that ac tions o f  that kind would not ne cessari ly 
solve anythi ng in the long run . Once you are i n  Phnom Penh , what next? 
Certainly Vietnamese leaders are aware o f  the serious regional and 
international repercussions i f  they move in that direction . 
As for inter-party re lations , Ben Kiernan has di scussed thi s , 
and also Carlyl e Thayer .  Unti l some time in the 1 960s the Vi etnamese 
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Communist Party c le arly served a s  ' o lder brother ' to the Khmer 
communi sts . Whe ther thi s  was o f  long term bene fit to the Khmer ' younger 
brothers ' i s  open to di scussion . I do not thi nk there i s  any di sputing 
the re lative weaknes s  of the Marxi st-Lenini st movement in Cambodia 
right up to the prese nt . Now , whether or not they would have been in 
a better position today if they had been entirely separated from the 
Vietname se movement i s  an intere sting hypothetical question . 
Khmer communi sts did have grievances in te rms o f  their .re lations 
with Vi etname se communists . The 1 9 5 4  Geneva Con ference was one 
turning point . I would want to add , however , that Vietnam also had 
i ts grievances vi s -a-vi s the Chine se and the Soviet Union at the Geneva 
Con ference . Vie tnam had reason to fee l  that i ts arm was being twi s ted 
perhaps in much the same way that the Cambodi ans felt regarding the 
Vietnamese . Again in 1 9 7 3  the Cambodians had a grievance , in that the 
P ari s Peace Agreement was concluded by the Vie tnamese and the Ameri cans 
in such a �ay as to permit the Ameri cans to switch their bombing attacks 
to Cambodia . Whe ther the Vie tnamese had any choi ce is also open to 
question , however . 
I t  must have been a severe shock to Vie tnamese communists in 
197 5-76 to see a younger group o f  Khmer revolutionaries violently 
purge the older members , and then use the anti -Vietname se theme as 
a devi ce to retain mass support . In all my di scussions with Vietnamese 
leaders there was a deep sense o f  anger coupled with an hone s t  inability 
to understand why any Khmer communi s t  might want to do thi s . 
Part o f  the problem stems from very di ffe rent perceptions o f  
poli ti c s  by the two communist leadership s . Obvious ly each has di f ferent 
ways o f  mobili zing masses of people , di f feri ng theories and p lans for 
economic development , and di fferent ways o f  approaching regional and 
international relations . All o f  thi s  probably keeps the two countries 
at odds even assuming they can ove rcome thei r  hi storical animositie s .  
On the other hand , i t  also sugge sts that a change in communi st leader­
ship in ei ther of the two countri es , but mos t  likely in Kampuche a ,  that 
reduce s or eliminate s thi s ideological chasm may be the key to overcoming 
the sad hi stori cal legacy . 
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Then there i s  the Sino -Soviet di spute a s  a factor i n  the 
Vietnam-Kampuchea confli c t .  The Soviet Union hung o n  in the Phnom 
Penh of the Uni ted Sta tes and Lon Nol far longer than was wi se , and was 
thus unceremoniously kicked out i n  1 9 7 5 . Chi na quickly became Kampuchea ' s  
sole maj or forei gn supporter . I t  i s  not a comfortable posi tion for 
China to be in , however , and one can imagine Teng Hsiao-ping and 
associates gnashing the i r  teeth at the situation . 
What do the two primary antagonists , Kampuchea and Vietnam , 
want as solutions to the conflict? Vietnam i s  probably prepared to 
negoti ate a border on the basi s  o f  the NLF-Sihanouk agreement o f  1 966 . 
The sea delineation remains more di f fi cult to resolve than the one on 
land . Beyond matters of terri tory , Vie tnam would like to see a leader­
ship in Phnom Penh that i s  at least not vio lently hosti le , even i f  
not necessari ly the closest o f  comrades .  Thi s  brings us to the question 
o f  what is the ' special relationship ' to be achieved be tween the former 
I ndochina state s . I have asked Vietname se to de fine that , and they 
have re ferred to the special re lationship wi th Laos . I do not think 
any independent Kampuchean government is going to accept that as an 
appropriate mode l .  Meanwhi le the Vi etnamese are cultivating Kampuchean 
alternatives to Pol Pot ,  but presumably they are wi se enough to reali ze 
that someone who i s  promoted today may not necessari ly be subservi ent 
tomorrow . 
Es sentially what Vi etnam i s  looking for i s  not to have three 
enemies on i ts border . Clearly Laos is not an enemy . Vie tnam can not 
do much to change China ' s  position . So that leaves Kampuchea . What 
doe s  Kampuchea wan t? Having read Ben Kie rnan ' s  paper , it seems to me 
that Kampuchea wants a public admi ssion from Vie tnam that the lowe r 
Mekong de lta was stolen . Thi s resembles the Chinese atti tude regarding 
19th century los ses to Russia . China and Kampuchea want a moral st atement 
above all , whi ch I do not think ei ther the Russians or the Vi etname se 
are prepared to give , s ince it would involve complete reas sessments o f  
national i denti ty . 
Turning now to the Vietnam-China di spute , the first thi ng to 
emphasize i s  its linkage wi th the Vie tnam-Kampuchea con flict . Kampuchea 
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is  more at the root of today ' s di f fe rence s between Hanoi and Peking than 
the ove rseas Chi nese , the offshore i s lands , or even pe rhap s , re lations 
wi th the Soviet Union . Since 1975  Chi na has supporte d  Kampuchea at 
each cruci al j uncture . Wi thout thi s s upport Phnom Penh could not have 
taken such an uncompromi sing pos i tion regarding i ts di fferences with 
Vietnam . I f  we assume that Pol Pot i s  sane , that he i s  not some wild­
eyed fanati c bent on se l f-de struction , then i t  follows that he received 
certain guarantees from Peking as to what China would do for him in 
given situations . But China ' s withdrawal o f  economic aid to Vie tnam 
was one concrete way to provide support for Kampuchea . Peking 
claimed thi s  action was in retaliation for Vie tnam ' s treatment of the 
overseas Chi nese , but I think that was strictly secondary . I t  
certainly puts pre ssure o n  Hanoi , even i f  i t  also ri sks Vietnam going 
to the Soviet Union for more assistance . 
Thi s i s  not to i gnore the stric tly bilateral hi storical legacy . 
As Profe s sor Wang Gungwu indicates ,  there was a mi llenium o f  Chinese 
domination , and there were attempts by every maj or Chi ne se dynasty 
subsequently e i ther to reincorporate Vietnam or to reprimand i t  
forcibly , for not playing the appropriate role as younger brother . 
Even i f  one assume s that China will avoid re sort to force , and I for 
one make that assumption at thi s  point , the fac t  that Vi e tnam for the 
first time can use relations with another great power as a leverage 
must be very hard to get used to on the part o f  the Chinese . Neverthe less 
Vie tnam has learned from long experience that favourable relations 
wi th its gi ant northern nei ghbour must eventual ly be given priority �  
I t  has not expre ssed any terri torial design s  on China since the Sung 
dynasty . It  would probably be wi lling to accept the status quo 
regarding the o ffshore is lands . 
So , the big question i s , what doe s  China want? Frankly , that 
i s  the most puzzling que stion of all for me . I was frankly surpri sed , 
for example , by how upset a Chinese diplomat became when I sugge sted 
the idea of de facto recogni tion of the current Paracel-Spratleys 
si tuation .  He said very angrily that not an inch o f  sove reign 
Chine se soi l  wi ll ever be sacri fi ced . I pointed out that the hi stori cal 
arguments he had used to j usti fy possession of the Spratleys could 
apply equally to pos session of Vietnam itse l f , but he sai d , ' Oh no , 
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that was the feudal period ' .  The Vietnamese often get in the s ame 
contradi ctory pos i tion regarding the Cambodian s . They admit that 
the taking of the Mekong delta in the 18th century and the 1 9th 
century interference in Cambodian i nternal a ffairs were mani fes tations 
of feudal class val ue s , ye t the favourable territori al legacy o f  the 
Le and Nguyen kings i s  c learly to be defended today wi th the blood o f  
citi zens i f  the socialis t  republi c . 
I s  China anxious to prevent Vietnam from becoming not only 
the most powerful mil itary force i n  Southeast Asia , but also the 
s tronge st economic and poli tical influence on mainland Southeast Asia? 
Does Chi na see that prospect as absolute ly counter to i ts national 
interests? Or is  China ' s  response primari ly dete rmined by i ts on­
going di spute with the Sovie t  Union? Does i t  e xpect Vie tnam to remain 
clear o f  close relations with the Soviet Union? I really have not been 
able to ascertain from the statements made by China what the answers 
are to those que stions . 
Finally , I would like to s ay a few things on Vie tnam ' s 
perceptions o f  regional and inte rnational relations . With highest 
priori ty sti l l  being give n  to reconstruction and deve lopment , Vie tnam 
has tried de sperately to reduce the damage done by the Chinese wi thdrawal 
of so many economi c pro j e cts . Now i t  i s  said that COMECON may take 
up ten or more o f  these pro j e cts . Vietnam has approached India for a 
few more . There are the recent loans from the World Bank and the IMF 
which are unrelated to the Chinese pro j ects . The bottlene ck concerning 
Japanese loans and busine ss credi ts has been removed ,  although Japan 
may move s lowly so as not to o f  fend Chi na and several o f  the ASEAN 
countrie s .  Fore i gn private i nvestment continues to be very s low , 
very s ti cky , and thi s is  as much the fault o f  the Vietnamese as the 
private i nve s tors . I do not be lieve the Vie tnamese government has qui te 
figured out how far i t  wants to go along that line , or what the soc i al 
and political implications are o f  linking up wi th overseas capitalist 
markets . One can also assume that the Soviet Union i s  trying to 
di scourage such Vietnamese e xperimentation . 
As far as the Uni ted S tates i s  concerned , perhaps in 1 9 7 9  there 
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is some hope of progress in normali zation . Yet ,  surely the Vie tnamese 
cannot expect sign i fi cant he lp from the US for several years , especially 
i f  China i s  offended i n  the process . The Carter admini s tration cannot 
play the China card and the Vie tnam card simultaneously . 
All o f  the problems discussed so far , p lus the chance 
mi s fortunes of weather in the last few years , lead me to conclude 
that Vie tnam wi l l  be unable to ful fi l l  some key aspec ts of i ts current 
five year plan which continue s to the end o f  1980 . Economic di saster 
wi l l  be averted large ly because o f  s ubstantial he lp from COMECON . 
Only the next five year plan , from 1 981 to 1985 , wi l l  be able to 
demonstrate whether Vie tnam can real ly fashion its own independent 
mix of fcreign econo�c re lationships or is de s tined to become a long­
term mendi cant of COMECON . 
As regards ASEAN , open disputes with Kampuchea and China have 
clearly been the main reason for Vie tnam ' s new approach to Southeast 
Asi a .  It is an e ffort by Vie tnam to explai n her position on those 
di sputes and perhaps make some modes t  bi lateral gains . I do not 
think Vietnam has any intention or des i re at the moment to j oin 
ASEAN . Nor doe s Hanoi expect much from any zone o f  neutrality 
formula .  We have not di scussed Thai land at all , but I thi nk i t  i s i n  
a n  important and sensitive position a t  the moment . I t  wi ll be 
interesting to see i f  Bangkok can live up to i ts diplomati c  
reputation and avoid taking s i de s  in Indochina a s  we ll as negotiating 
the peri lous waters of the Sino -Soviet di spute . 
I t  should be apparent that Vietnam has a long term interest 
in trying to prevent the complete domi nation o f  Southeas t  Asia by 
any great power or cluster o f  maj or powers . The old colonial powers 
have faded . Japan fai led in i ts attempt at mi litary domination , 
but of course has to be watched from an economic perspective . The 
US also fai led mi li tari ly yet retained signi fi cant economi c and strategic 
intere sts in the area . Looki ng to the future , i t  would not help 
Vietnam to have ei ther the Soviet Union or China domi nate Southeas t 
Asi a .  
What must send shivers down the spine s o f  Vietnamese leaders 
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i s  any prospect o f  a d e  facto all i ance between the Uni ted State s , 
Japan and Chi na . That would be the only scenario that might drive 
Vie tnam i nto a deep strategi c dependence on the Soviet Union . Your 
e stimate of the chances o f  such a de facto alliance developing in 
the next five years is as  good as  mine , but there are certainly 
plenty o f  signs in the wind . A US-Jap an-China alliance would certainly 
polari ze Southeast Asi a ,  and i ndeed most of the world . As Australia 
i s  hardly a di spassionate bystander ,  we should do all we can to 
encourage ope n  debate o f such matters . 
D I S CUS S I ON I 
Discussion in the first session opened wi th one participant 
posing the que stion .: what are the mai n  reasons for the severi ty o f  
the dome stic polici e s  o f  the Kampuchean government? H e  s a i d  that the 
' fundamentali sm '  o f  leaders o f  the government had been suggested to 
him as a possible element in thi s phenomenon . 
Other e lements o f  explanation advanced in response to the 
que stion included : 
The destructio n  wrought by US bombing during the war , which 
had ' destroyed the country economically ' ,  and ' le ft a lot of very angry 
people , and in the long term starvation ' .  The leadership had also 
been ' very much depleted ' by long years of fighting . 
The Kampuchean national psychology , which i s  charac teri zed by 
' stubbornne ss ' , and an ' inabil i ty to compromi se ' . 
The speed wi th which the revolution was carried out had meant 
there was ' no time to bui ld up a set o f  policies ' .  One o f  the 
Kampuchean revolutionary leaders was quoted as saying : ' We have 
nothing to go on , no precedents . We ' re not acting on anything that ' s  
happened in our pa st ' . 
The widespread use o f  young people who have been sent to areas 
other than thei r  own whe re , without much knowledge of national custom 
and sti l l  less of local custom , they have proceeded to carry out 
ac tivities such as the defrocking of Buddhi st monks , and so on . 
Two matters were rai sed by a second questioner : the role o f  
Khieu Samphan , president ,  o r  head o f  state , in the P o l  Po t regime ; 
and the role o f  Prince Sihanouk , and i n  parti cular whether the re was 
' any possibi lity of hi s re turning to play a use ful role ' .  
The view was expre ssed that although Khieu Samphan he ld a very 
high nominal position , and made a broadcast each year on the Apri l 1 7  
revolutionary anniversary , ' he was not in the central core of the 
leadership ' .  Di scussion on thi s  matter led to re ference s  to divi sions 
in the Kampuchean leadership , and to ' very serious purge s going on 
throughout 1 9 7 7  which culmi nated in the defection of the vi ce-president 
to Vie tnam . . .  he i s  now working as l eader o f  the rebel group sponsored 
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by Vie tnam ' . ( The re ference was probably to a person known as So 
Phim -- Ed . )  Divi sions had been so serious that in the course o f  1976  
Po l Pot himself  had been removed from hi s posi tion ' for about a month ' .  
On Prince S ihanouk , it  was stated that ' there i s  no chance a� 
all ' o f  hi s returning to influence . One speaker stated : ' I f there 
is one thing that has persi sted i n  the communist movement in Kampuchea 
i t  is i ts opposition to Sihanouk and S ihanouk ' s  opposition to i t ' . 
There had been a largely unpublicized ' full-scale war ' between the 
two side s be tween 1967- 7 0 . 
1 
Commenting that the Kampuchean 
leadership seemed to lack any sense of humour , the same speaker 
conceded that they showed a flair for ' black humour ' in  blowing up 
the national bank , aboli shing money in Kampuchea ,  and then voting 
Pri nce Sihanouk a pension paid i n  US dollars , with which he could 
pu rchase nothing . 
Di scussion then turned to the tripartite US-China-Vietnam 
re lationships . 
In connection with what was called ' a  bit of a race ' be tween 
China and Vi e tnam to normali ze relations wi th the US , the view was 
expre ssed that the US placed a much higher priori ty on normali zing 
relations wi th Chi na than wi th Vie tnam .. The former US Secretary o f  
State , D r  Ki ssinger , was quoted as  saying : ' Now we ' re out o f  Vie tnam , 
i t ' s a thi rd-grade country ' .  The point was made that in terms of US 
domestic opinion , ' there was no politi cal capi tal ' to be made out o f  
normali zing re la tions wi th Vie tnam . 
Another speaker stressed the inter-relationship between the 
two questions in that normali zation with Vietnam could act as  an 
impediment to normali zation with China , ' which must come fi rst ' . 
The same speaker made the point that the US administration ' s  ' ma j or 
di fficulty ' would be ge tting e i ther of the two things through Congre ss . 
The China que stion was ' a complex dome stic exercise ' ,  e specially in 
view of US re lationships wi th Taiwan , but ' the admi ni stration has to 
get the China issue through Congress as soon as i t  can between the 
Novembe r 1978  ele ctions and the presidential election in 1980 ' . 
The fol lowi ng speakers , recalling recent vi s i ts made by them 
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to Washington , mad e the following main points : 
The contradiction be tween China ' s  support for the Kampuchean 
regime , whose atrocities had been widely condemned in the US , and 
normali zation of US-China relations , would not be a ma j or problem . 
' I  don ' t  think the Ameri cans have eve r  been troubled wi th contradic tions ' ,  
the speaker sai d . 
Recalling conve rsations he had had wi th State Depar tment officials 
responsible for mainland Southeast Asi a , the same speaker sai d : ' They 
tended to be people who had served in various capac i ties in Vietnam , 
and they hated Vie tnam, they hated the Vie tnamese vic tory . . . All 
thi s  sort o f  thing i s  a real private venom , and I thi nk thi s  i s  he ld 
by people in Congress too , and e lsewhe re � a kind of backlash . . .  
I think what i s  happening i n  Vie tnam today i s  qui te shocking , but what 
appals me really i s  the swi ftness wi th which the Ame ricans forge t what 
we did there ourselves , and fai l to think o f  what percentage o f  blame 
for what i s  happening now i s  due to the Ameri cans . I t ' s  as i f  we 
were not involved at all . I t ' s as i f  we were talking about some 
strange tribe that ' s  j ust been di scovered by anthropologists ' . 
The next speaker di scerned ' several stage s ' in  the development 
of the Carter Admini s tration ' s  policy to the questions under di scussion . 
At first the administration had gone i n  ' wi th a degree of 
enthusiasm on China ' ,  and with Vie tnam as a lower priori ty . But i t  
was soon realize d that the ground had to b e  care ful ly prepared be fore 
the Ameri can people would accept normali zation o f  US -China re lations . 
As for Vietnam , i t  was above all ( US As sistant Secre tary o f  S tate ) 
Ri chard Holbrooke who was commi tted to the cause o f  normali zation o f  
US-Vie tnam relations . But he soon reali zed he was getting nowhere 
wi th the Vie tnamese , and this i ssue receded in importance . 
I n  a second stage , the whole complex o f  questions was ' put on 
the back burne r ' . 
In the present , thi rd , stage , the speaker sai d : ' Now I think 
we have a comple tely di f ferent si tuation where the new regime in Chin� 
the new Chinese power , has provoked a degree o f  thinking which i s  
di ffe rent .  Thi s  i s  evident i n  the administration , and probably in 
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Congre ss i n  a more complex way ' . The change i n  the Vietnamese 
attitude ( the dropping of precondi tions for normali zation o f  thei r  
relations wi th the US ) was also a new element . 
Summing up , the speake r  sai d : ' Many things are di fficult to 
predi ct at thi s  stage . I t  may be easier to do so ( i . e . , normali ze 
relations with Chi na and/or Vietnam) afte r  the November elections , 
when Carter ' s  posi tion in re spect o f  the Middle East and Sovi e t  
deve lopments i s  cle arer But on a vi s i t  of a few days to Washington 
in August I found there was a considerably more optimi stic view on 
prospe cts for improved relations both for China and Vietnam than when 
I was last there in March ' .  
Di scussion closed with a parti cipant quoti ng an edi torial of 
July 1 in  the French newspaper Le monde , dealing wi th the de ci sion by 
Vietnam to j oin the Sovie t-dominated economic bloc COMECON . The 
edi torial said notably : ' Re sponsibi l i ti e s  for the present cri si s  are 
widely shared . I f  the Wes t  had had another atti tude a fter the end of 
the war in 1 9 7 5  Vie tnam would not have been forced by the need to 
secure aid ,  even i f  poli tically tied aid ,  to ali gn i tself as i t  has 
done ' .  
Footnote 
1 .  A ful l account o f  thi s i s  given i n  Ben Kiernan , The Sam Zau t 
Rebe l lion and its Aftermath : the Origin of Cambodia ts Libera tion 
Movement,, Monash University , Centre for South Ea st Asian S tudies k 
Work ing Papers no 4 and 5 ,  1 9 7 5  
CHINA-VIETNAM : 
NOS TALG I A  FOR , RE JE C T ION OF , THE PAS T 
W ang Gungwu 
I wi ll try to be very brie f  about a number of the more important 
things which , I fee l , need some historical background . Very brie fly : 
what i s  Chi na so angry about? The four which in my view might do most 
to answer thi s  que stion are as follows : 
First the ques tion o f  grati tude for assistance given . Secondly 
the treatment of the hua-ch ' iao ( Overseas Chinese ) .  Thirdly the leaning 
to one side , in thi s  case to the Sov iet Union instead o f  to China , 
and fourthly , the que stion o f  Cambodia ,  the bullying o f  Cambodia , the 
des i re as the Chine se see it of the Vietnamese to dominate Cambodi a , 
to dominate the whole o f  the former French Indochina , and thei r  fear 
that thi s  could be merely a step in the direction of Vie tname se 
domination over the whole o f  the area to the south and southwest of 
China in the coming period . 
I think there are a number o f  o ther thi ngs mentioned from 
time to time in the communiques and statements ,  but these four are 
the most signi fi can t .  I shall not , however t deal wi th a l l  aspects 
equally .  The first point about ingratitude i s  sub j e ctive and emotional 
and I have nothing directly to say about i t . I t  i s  one which may 
be better understood i f  the whole hi storical context i s  examined and 
it is thi s  context which I wi ll concentrate on here . My approach 
to the i s s ue of Chinese anger is to ask , ' What has changed from the 
hi story that the Chinese are accustomed to , when , in 'the pas t ,  they 
looked at thi s  area to their south and southwe st? ' And also to comment 
on what has no t change d .  
Let me start with what has not changed . I think in fac t ,  that 
the only thing related to the four i ssue s  that I have mentioned that 
reflects no change i s  thi s  Chinese support for Cambodi a . Thi s  aspect 
i n  fact goes very deep i nto Chinese practi ce i n  their re lations wi th 
the so uth . From the very beginning , i f  we look back at the way the 
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Chinese  viewed countries all round them , e specially those i n  the south , 
and in particular Vietnam ,  there was thi s  concern to be , as i t  were , 
a kind o f  arbi ter in all the power relations i n  the area whenever China 
was drawn in . Most o f  the time Chi na did not care at all what happened 
in the south and , in fact ,  the Chi nese never directly or active ly 
interfered , intervened or were even curious about what was happening 
in the area except where they were drawn in through the fact that 
the se countries traded wi th Chi na and operated some thing l ike a tributary 
system, or at !east nominally a tributary system. There were maj or 
gaps in the relationships and there was never any unbroken relationship 
between any single country and China , except probably in more recent 
times between , say , Thai land and China . The one country that was forced 
to have an almost continuous relationship wi th China in the south was 
Vit�tnam and there were very special reasons for that . 
What has not changed i s  that whenever there was a question o f  
a neighbour o f  Vie tnam appealing t o  Chi na or re ferring to China 
problems they were having with Vietnam, the Chinese invariably tried 
to be the arbiter , to calm the Vie tnamese down and to try to hold 
back and restrai n the Vie tnamese from bullying thei r  neighbours to the 
west and south . The clas sic e xample i s  that o f  Champa . I think 
there i s  a lot o f  material at the end o f  the lOth century down to the 
llth and 1 2 th ,  right through to the end o f  Champa , where the role the 
Chinese were asked to play � they were not always able to play any 
role at all , but whenever they were asked they tried to do so � was 
to send me ssage s to the Vi� tnamese to i ndicate their disapproval o f  
Vietnamese fighting wi th the Chams . Now the Vietnamese were o f  course 
seeing matters quite di ffe rently . Very o ften they would see the si tuation 
as in fact obligi ng them to de fend themselves against very aggressive 
Cham attacks . But fundamentally the Chinese did not see i t  that way 
and there are certain relationships between Vietnam and Cambodia today 
which remind me ve ry much o f  the re lations between Vietnam and Champa 
in the early days ,  involving China too in that sort o f  way . The other 
side which is related to thi s  � the lack of change i s  that in 
general the Chinese did not want to involve themselves too much with 
the south because they were so concerned wi th the dangers from the north . 
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As the Chinese see i t , the maj or threats in the past , and 
today , have come from overland , from the north , northeast , northwest , 
but e ssenti ally from the north � and that condi tion , that problem for 
the Chi nese , I thi nk , remains so real today that i t  affects all thei r  
j udgements o n  que stions concerning thei r  borders . The Vie tnam problem , 
o f  course , immedi ately come s into that picture . China would not want 
to have any troubl e i n  the south because the trouble in the nor th is 
far too great , far too dangerous . There are new fac tors whi ch I wi ll 
come to later on , but essentially thi s  is the only part , I think , where 
there has been no real change from the pa st . 
Le t me bri efly now talk about what has changed . In three areas 
the re have been important change s .  Fi rst , there i s  a very broad 
point I want to make . We often talk about ' East  Asi a ' ,  and j us t  now 
I said that Vie tnam was the only country in the south to have had 
continuous re lations wi th China , the only one . Now the East Asian 
concept o ften invo lve s talk about Chinese civi lization * whi ch covers 
the area of Korea and Vie tnam as well as China . Some people even 
extend i t  to Japan , although that i s  most controversial , a proposi tion 
I have great di fficulty in accepting . But i n  discussions o f  an ' East 
Asi an ' area , many compari sons have been made between Vi etnam and Korea 
in their re lations with China , and emphasis laid on their simi lari ti es . 
I n  fact , for much o f  the time relations between Vi e tnam and Chi na on 
the one hand and Korea and China on the other bear no resemblance 
whatsoever . I t  has be en a grave error to attempt to extend what China 
did in Korea to what China did in Vietnam , and I think we must be very , 
ve ry care ful not to draw compari sons be tween the two . In fact , all 
the compari sons suggest , whe re they compare a t  all , that di fference 
is far more signi ficant than simi l arity . But therefore if not East 
Asi a  what was there before? The term ' East Asia 1 is a very much more 
modern term . That ' s  not how China saw it anyway . China saw the 
problem i n  terms of being surrounded in di fferent directions by many 
di f ferent powers . They had certain ways o f  dealing in the north with 
Korea , in the we st with Tibet , and wi th the southwestern minori ty peoples , 
di fferent pol i c i e s  again . In fac t , the Chinese we re pret ty fle xibl e ; 
they had ili ffe rent policies for di f ferent directions , di fferent areas 
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o f  i n te re s t . Wi th Vietnam i t  was a special one , not the same a s  for 
any o f  the othe rs . And i t  was not the same as any others because i t  
was the one area whi ch I think the Chinese could never really forget 
that they had actually ruled for nearly a thousand years and then 
lost . Now I am not goi ng to talk about how they lost i t ,  why they 
lost i t , and how the Chi nese actually successively tri ed to reconci le 
themse lves to that loss . But I thi nk i t  i s  a grave factor . It  has 
created an absolute ly unique re lationship for both sides , and I stress 
this because I think by drawing other analogies we are l ikely to make 
errors in our j udgements about China ' s  relations wi th Vie tnam . 
And I say agai n , i f  not ' East Asia ' ,  i s  there any kind o f  
regic , 1al  grouping beyond the unique relationship be tween China and 
Vie '  . .. nam? Now we have also in the last thirty years or so been 
bui lding up the concept of Southeast Asia . We have paid a lot o f  
at tention to i t .  I thi nk w e  have been relative ly succe s s ful in creating 
and winning international acceptance for the concep t o f  Southeast 
Asi a . But doe s this mean anything to China , doe s  i t  fit in? Inso far 
as it is an idea starting from after the Second World War , obvious ly 
it is new . The Chines e  had no conception of Southeast Asia , nor did 
the re st of the world be fore 1 94 5 . But the conception o f  Southeast 
Asia doe s not really fit any Chine se conception of the south at all . 
The re i s , however , one area in whi ch thi s  concept might bear upon 
future Chi nese thinking . I f  they wi l l  not necessari ly accept the idea 
of Southeast Asia as such , the unique relationship , as I said , between 
�hina and Vie tnam and i ts immediate neighbours ( in thi s case Cambodia 
as in  the past wi th Champa ) ,  may eventually draw China into a different 
awareness o f  the south . With these relationships in mind , the Chinese 
might come , under pres sure o f  world conside rations , to a new awareness 
o f  their relationships not wi th Southeast Asia as a whole but wi th the 
l ittoral states o f  thei r  ' Mediterranean ' ,  the South China Sea . 
I f  you go back to the past , the Chinese saw overland re lations 
wi th the southwe st minoriti es , with Laos and Burma , and wi th all the 
areas inhabi ted by tribal groups around Kwangsi ,  Yunnan and the borders 
between Burma and Laos � as qui te di stinct and separate from their 
relations stemming mainly from Canton , wi th the li ttoral s ta t e s  of 
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the South China Sea . Today , i f  you really drew the attention o f  the 
Chinese to the south , it seems to me that an overall concept o f  the 
oceani c ,  sea-goi ng re lationship wi th the l ittoral states o f  thi s  
' Medi terranean ' might have more meaning for them than the concept o f  
Southeast Asi a . I think i t  i s  not an accident that Chinese relations 
wi th Burma have already evolved very di fferently from Chine se relations 
wi th any other country in Southeast Asi a . It is not an accident . And 
I think the present problems concerning Laos re flect some o f  these 
di fficulties .  Laos i s  seen as a landlocked state of the overland 
connection , wi th overland relations with the minori ty peoples in the 
southwest o f  China , and the Chinese would prefer , i f  they could possibly 
arrange i t ,  to continue to work along thos e  line s . But despi te thi s  
pre ference , I think circumstances have probably changed too much for 
them to try to do that successfully . 
I think the new situation in the south opens things up and make s  
i t  more like ly for the Chine se to see a new s e t  o f  relationships 
developing around thi s so-cal led Medi terranean-South Chi na Sea . I t  
involve s , o f  course , a l l  o f  ASEAN , Cambodia ,  and Vie tnam and so on . 
I f  Taiwan retains i ts independence , Taiwan too becomes a s eparate 
parti cipant in thi s Medi terranean connection . Now thi s  i s  new . As 
I said , the Chinese have never really seen the South China Sea as  
a sea with a littoral-state system , and a possible inter-state system 
ari sing from the coun trie s  around the South China Sea . But I think 
if they are goi ng to be pushed away from the ' central kingdom ' idea , 
pushed towards the south , i t  may not be towards Southeast Asia that 
the Chine se wi l l  look , but to a South China Sea li ttoral region which 
they would understand better and whi ch would be much more comfortable 
for them to work wi th .  Of course , the implications of thi s  are great , 
because i t  involves all the scattered i s lands .il1 the middle o f  the South 
China Sea , all the various po tential quarrel s  whi ch wi ll ari se i f  we 
in fact look inwards to the South China Sea from the countrie s 
surrounding i t .  Let me not take thi s too far , but j ust leave i t  as 
a thought . 
The second maj or di ffe rence I think concerns what may be called 
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the ' French connection ' .  I use thi s  term not because I think France 
is at all  important now . But the French conne ction was signi ficant 
in hi storical te rms , as it were , tearing Vie tnam away from tradi tional 
relations wi th China . I t  was signi fi cant in that i t  involved a great 
forei gn power from somewhere else . In  the whol e  hi story o f  the relations 
between Vietnam and China , Vie tnam had never had a protector to look 
after i ts interests against China . The Koreans had always had very 
complex relations wi th the northeastern part of Asia , which offered 
various counter-bal ancing forces whe ther they were Khitans ,  Jurchens , 
Mongols , or Manchus , to their long hi storical ti es wi th China . The 
Koreans always had to wei gh all  the se factors and had to make decis ions , 
very di ffi cult pol i ti cal deci sions , as to which side to depend on . On 
the whole , the Koreans did better than China in de fending their country 
against barbarian enemies  to the north � that i s  at least in their 
Korean l i terature , i n  their tradi tion . 
the Vie tnamese had nobody to look to . 
To the south , on the contrary , 
The only power that was anywhere 
near them was China immediately to their north . They had to pay obeisance 
to some of the rhe tori c that the Chinese insisted upon ; to some extent 
they were also quite prepared to accept i t .  But there wa s nobody e l se . 
I t  had to be a very delicate and e xtreme ly sensitive rel ationship 
calling for ski l l s , diplomatic ski l l s , on the part of the Vie tnamese , 
and ca l ling for great preparedness for de fen ce against any Chi nese 
attack all through the hi story o f  their re lations . The unequal power 
re lationship was obvious to the Vie tnamese , but there was nobody else 
they could turn to for he lp . The intervention o f  the French in the 
mi ddle o f  the 19th century introduced a new factor , a complete ly new 
factor . For a hundred ye ars the French provided a countervai ling force 
in relations wi th China that the Vietnamese had never had . Now 
that the French have gone , and the Uni ted Sates has gone , at least the 
Vi etname se have experienced the privi lege of having a protector from 
somewhere e lse against any unreasonable demands the Chi nese mi ght make 
upon them. I think thi s i s  whe re the Soviet Union come s in . Not 
because the Vie tname se like the Soviet Union , or parti cularly trust 
the Soviet Union , but be cause the Soviet Union replaces the French , 
and i f  the Ame rican s and the Japanese would do some thing along the same 
lines I think the Vie tname se would we l come the whole lot . 
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The French connection was s imply the beginning o f  a new kind 
o f  connection that p laced Vietnam in a totally new relationship wi th 
China . At least thi s i s  how I think the Vietnamese understand i t  
and I thi nk this i s  the part that troubles the Chinese most . Inso far 
as the Chi nese talked about ' lips and tee th ' and used other rhetorical 
terms to express how c lose the Chinese and the Vie tnamese have always 
been and so on , they were probably more impre ssed by the past situation 
of a qui te unique relationship between China and Vie tnam .  I thi nk they 
would very much l ike to get back to square one on that i f  at all  possible . 
I would sugge st that thi s  i s  no t  pos s ible and because i t  i s  not possible 
the Chine se are uncomfortable . They do not know how to re spond to a 
situation in which the Vie tnamese , a fter getting rid o f  thei r  colonial 
masters , now re tain ,  as i t  were , the lovely idea o f  having a connection 
outside which would give them protection and freedom from the kind of 
meek subservient relationship that they had to have wi th China in the 
past . 
And qui ckly to the l ast point about the Overseas Chinese . Thi s  
i s  new . But you can also say that i t  i s  not new because there have 
always been Chinese who went to Vietnam for one reason or another , -­
poli ti cal refugees , criminals e scaping from the Chinese authoritie s ,  
traders who settled i n  Vi e tnam over the centurie s . There have a lways 
been Chinese who settled in Vietnam even after Vi etnam became i ndependent 
i n  the l Oth century . Thi s has been a continuous relationship r so 
what is new about i t? What is new is something that was created by 
China at the turn of thi s century . I t  i s  qui te possible that thi s  
was in fluenced by the moderni zing proce ss o f  identi fying nationality , 
legal i dentity , politi cal i denti ty , and so on , which occurred almost 
everywhere at that time . The real change , however , came about when 
the Chinese adopted the term hua ch ' iao � I have wri tten e l sewhere 1 
about thi s . But I think there i s  a tremendous di ffe rence be tween 
talking about j ust Chine se who happened to be overseas and to using 
the technical term hua- ch ' iao which was introduced only at the turn 
of the century . Be fore that the Chine se atti tude towards Chinese who 
l e ft , whether criminal s ,  traders or pol i ti cal re fugees , was that they 
were doing something terribly wrong . Essentially , leaving China to 
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go t o  live somewhere e lse was a way o f  cutting yoursel f  off  completely 
from China , goi ng into conplete exile . I t  was in fac t  a c rime from 
the Ming dynasty onwards and once you got out it was extremely diffi cult 
for you to return . When you did return there were all kinds o f  
re stri ctions , penaltie s  and s o  on , for having gone out o f  China a t  all . 
Therefore the words used for such Chinese who went out o f  Chi na were 
always very simple and re ferred to someone untrustworthy , someone who 
was a vagrant or vagabound , and basically someone unworthy o f  
attention .  H e  was possibly even a traitor or a potential trai tor , 
a spy for fore i gn powers and so on . 
So the whole attitude had been very straightforward and a very 
negative one . But at the turn o f  the century , due to circumstances 
which I need not go into now , the Chinese government eventual ly 
began to complete ly reassess the Chinese overseas in terms o f  nationality , 
in terms o f  Chinese responsibi l i ty for the protection o f  Chinese 
subj ects . All these concepts they had actually picked up from European 
law .  They finally got the hang o f  i t  and decided to use the technical 
term hua-ch ' iao . O f  course i t  is not entirely techni cal , it is also 
very loose ly used for Overseas Chinese . But the technical side come s 
from the word ch ' iao i tse l f . Ch ' iao actually means a transient 
vi sitor , someone who has not permanently l e ft China but is temporari ly 
resident abroad . Thi s  had neve r  been o fficially acknowledged in 
the past . Of course they knew there were some Chinese who were 
temporari ly resident traders , for examp le , who came back and forth . 
But the recognition , the official recogni tion , o f  the temporary 
re sidence abroad created the problem that whi le such Chinese were 
abroad they remained the citi zens of China and might need protection .  
China now had some o ffi cial role to play i n  trying to protect them . 
Now that was qui te new and i t  has created almost al l the di ffi cultie s 
that China now has wi th each o f  the Southeast Asian countrie s  in which 
there are large numbe rs o f  Chinese . 
Now far be it for me to criticize the fact that the Chine se 
overseas wanted to be pro tected by China and felt extremely he lpless 
against coloni al powers . Some such powers were more reasonable than 
s o  
others , but on the whol e  the Overseas Chinese communi ti e s  were 
discrimi nated against . I t  was a pre tty mi serable li fe for a Chinese 
livi ng abroad i n  Southeast Asi a  when there was no such protection . 
The Overseas Chine se themselves demanded and asked for protection . 
Thi s  was not something that the Chinese government i nven ted off  the 
top o f  their he ads � obviously there was a new s i tuation and the 
Chinese government had to respond . But thei r  response to i t  was very 
much influenced by learning how use ful Overseas Chinese could be because 
of the fortunes they we re making in Southeast Asi a .  Thi s , i n  fact , 
was the main argument at the end o f  the 1 9th century that was put 
be fore the Chinese emperor .  There was a lot o f  capital out there and 
i f  only the Chinese could be asked to i nvest the i r  capital back in 
Chi na i t  would be a great help to Chinese moderni zation , industriali zation 
and so on . I t  was argued that a l l  thi s was going to waste by letting 
i t  remain i n  Southeast Asi a .  That was the maj or thrust o f  the 
argument leading eventually to the government recognizing that traders 
temporari ly resident abroad should be given protection . Certainly 
the re were othe r factors as well , but I think this was ultimate ly the 
most telling one that persuaded the Manchu-Ch ' ing government to change 
their policy towards the Overseas Chinese at the turn of the century . 
I think thi s factor i s  sti l l  relevant today . But many problems 
exi st as to the status of Overseas Chinese to whom protection must 
be given , and the function of the Chinese state , i nsofar as it rai ses 
expectations among the Chinese abroad , insofar as i t  create s hierarchies 
o f  re lationships among Chinese who are sti l l  Chinese citi zens , Chinese 
who are state less in di fferent parts of Southe ast Asia , and Chinese 
who have become citi zens of the di f ferent countr ies in Southeast Asi a . 
There are also Chinese who , i n  fact , have been virtual ly absorbed into 
the population but who may sti l l  retain a Chinese name and Chi nese 
customs and who have not become Chri stians or Moslems or who have not 
rediscovered Buddhi sm in any sor t o f  way . They remain as a fourth 
category . So there has emerged a series , a hierarchy of categories 
o f  Overseas Chinese , and I think thi s has really complicated all the 
i ssues for China . The s e  i s s ue s  are new . Whe re Vi e tnam i s  conce rned , 
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of course , the Chinese did not have , or did not seem to have , the 
awareness that over the past century and a half , that unique situation 
of the past was being disturbed by a number of quite fundamental changes 
in geopolitics, in regional orientation and in this question of the 
status of the Overseas Chinese . Because they have not given adequate 
consideration to how much the Vietnamese want to free themselves from 
the old relationship with China and how much they want to move to a 
new relationship , the Chinese have made quite a number of miscalculations 
in the last few months . 
Foo tno te 
1 .  ' A  note on the Origins of Hua-Ch ' iao ' , in Lie Tek T j eng (ed . ) , 
Masa Zah-Masa Zah Internasio na Z  M:J.sakini (7) , L IP! , Jakarta , 1977 , 
pp. 7-18. 
C H I NA AN D V I E TNAM : 
1 9 7 8  DEVE LOPMENTS 
I an W il s on 
The Chinese Peop le ' s  Repub lic 
The Chine se pos i tion on the events in Kampuchea and those on 
i ts own border with Vi etnam is an evolving one and not all i ts aspec ts 
are clear at thi s stage , but i t  does seem to be an e ssentially re.active 
policy whi ch i s  developing in respons e  to ac tions taken by Vietnam 
as pe rceived in Peking . Wi thout attempting to place these di spute s 
in the same category as others in whi ch China has re sorted to the 
actual use o f  force , e i ther to signal its intentions or to deter an 
adve rsary , it i s  use ful to look back on these earlier confli cts for 
what they can te ll us about a Chinese ' calculus of dete rrence ' ,  as 
Al len Whiting terms i t , or perhaps more accurate ly in the current 
s i tuation , China ' s  use o f  coercive diplomacy . 
In the three most important dispute s in whi ch China has 
mobi li zed troops and deployed them beyo rrl her own boundaries , namely 
in Korea in 1950 , in India in 196 2  and in North Vie tnam be tween 1964 
and 1968 , China ' s  leadership was in broad agreement about the vulnerable 
posi tion of the nation , and i n  each case thi s vulnerabi lity was 
re lated to the dome stic situation . In two of the se case s re lations 
wi th the Soviet Union had deteriorated to the point where China ' s  
vulne rability was increased by the danger o f  tacit collusion by the 
two supe rpowers against China . I t  mus t be noted that the current 
di spute s wi th Vie tnam take place against a background o f  dome s tic 
s tabi li ty and con fiden ce, whi le the opening to Washington has removed 
the possibi lity of China having to confront both superpowers 
s imultaneous ly . 
China ' s  response to the earlier provocations 1.and threats was 
one of be lligerence jn order to dete r the adversary from pursuing hi s 
intentions as they were di scerned in Peking , but in each case be llige rent 
action was based on an open statement o f  the Chinese posi tion in the 
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di spute formulated i n  highly principled terms . Very early in each 
di spute troops were moved close to operational positions wi th li ttle 
attempt to conceal these movements , although in the Korean confl ict 
the US fai led to appreciate the sign i fi cance o f  the mobilization and 
in 196 2 Indian mi li tary inte llige nce was i nadequate . I n  no case did 
China either abandon non-mili tary avenues to resolve the conflict or 
allow the conflict to reach the point whe re China had no prudent 
option or comfortable fall-back position . 
Chi na ' s  style o f  coercive diplomacy has not been static but 
has improved with experience so that the poor signalling , the fai lure 
to appreciate that a pos i tion may not seem credible to an adversary , 
the need to rely on doubtful third parties and the problems o f  
mi sperception which characte ri zed China ' s  behaviour over Korea were 
not repeated in the delicate move s and counter-moves over Vietnam 
between 1964 and 1 968 . In particular , the US was always allowed to 
retain some ' face ' and a relative ly honourable e scape route from the 
con frontation . Timing was also more sophi s ticated . The fi rst warnings 
were is sued early , long be fore the threat was immi nent . The signalling 
had a rhyth� whi ch al lowed the enemy time to assess the new si tuation 
and then respond wi thout gaining the initiative in the exchange . 
In the current di spute wi th Vietnam i t  has been the Hoa people , 
usually defined as Vie tnamese o f  Chinese origi n , who have consti tuted 
the main obj ects o f  di ffe rence , whereas the underlying cause s  o f  the 
breach have received little public attention to date . Consequen tly 
it is upon the 195 5 discus s ions between the Chine se and Democratic 
Republic o f  Vie tnam governments on the nationality o f  Chinese residents 
that the CPR ' s ' principled stand ' rests . Vietnam i s  accused of going 
back on these di scussions , although publication o f  the substance of 
the di scussions o r  o f  any agreements reached whi ch might strengthen 
the Chinese case has not taken place . Instead the Vietnamese authorities 
have accused Chi na o f seeking to foment di scord between the two nations 
by encouraging the ' i llegal emi gration ' of Hoa people s ince Apri l .  By 
late May Peking reports mentioned that some 89 , 000  had le ft and that 
there had been inci dents involving Vietnamese armymen fi ring on re fugee 
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boats . Hong Kong reports at the time sugge sted that PLA force s  
stationed i n  the southern provinces adj acent to the border numbered 
about 1 5 0 , 000  men , although how many had been moved south recently 
and there fore consti tuted a re sponse to the Vie tnamese charges of 4 
May i s  not clear . However , an early warning o f  the serious light in 
whi ch China viewed the incidents was i ssued on 24 May , accusing the 
Vie tnamese authori ties  o f  ' arbi trary , truculent and i l legal actions ' .  
The Vie tnamese we re told that they must ' bear full responsibi lity for 
all the consequence s ' .  
The Vietnamese response came three days later in the form o f  
a proposal to meet to resolve the problem o f  the s tatus o f  the Hoa 
people . The proposal was di smi ssed in Peking as ' pure propaganda ' on 
9 June and the Min i stry of Forei gn Affairs repeated the charges o f  
2 4  May l a i d  b y  the Overseas Chinese Affai rs Office ( OCAO ) that 
Vietname se public securi ty personne l had fomented the tension and were 
forcing Chinese re sidents to be come naturali zed or face di scrimination 
in employment and housing . A new note of warning was added and 
Vietnam was put on notice that the costs of handling and re settling 
the re fugee s would force China to cancel part o f  i ts ai d to Vie tnam .  
Thi s threat e lici ted n o  response from Hanoi , l e t  alone a 
conciliatory gesture , and was fol lowed by a strong statement from the 
Di rector o f  the OCAO , Liao Cheng-chih , accusing Vie tname s e  authori ties 
o f  pe rsecuting Chinese re sidents and thereby causing a serious 
de terioration in inter-state re lations .  Thi s was followed the next 
day , 16 June , by a formal note from the Mini s try o f  Foreign Affairs 
to Hanoi claiming obstructioni sm and delay in re fusing China permission 
to establi sh a consulate-general in Ho Chi Minh City , wi thdrawing 
the consul-general in consequence and at the same time closing the 
three provi ncial consulate s Vie tnam maintained in the Chinese southern 
centre s of Kwangchow , Nanning and Kunming . At thi s point two Chine se 
ves sels were on their way to Vie tnam to repatriate Chinese re sidents , 
although this does not appear to have been done with the agreement 
of Hanoi . 
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Real se ttlement o f  the publi c  i ssue s  was not facili tated by 
these move s , but on 16 June Hanoi noti fied Peking of the conditions 
under whi ch repatri ation could take p lace . Several of these condi tions 
proved unacceptable , particularly one whereunde r Vie tnamese authorities 
would decide which residents were e li gible for departure permi ts .  This 
led to a maj or s tep in the escalation o f  the conflict wi th the announcement 
on 3 July that economic and technical aid to Vietnam was being halted 
and that Chinese engineers and other technical personnel in Vietnam 
would be recalled . Thi s  step could not have been taken lightly and 
it placed China in an awkward posi tion . Only days earlier I had been 
entertained to a lengthy account of Soviet perfi dy in the wi thdrawal 
of technical aid i n  1 96 0 , an act which sti l l  seeme d  to rankle with 
the offi ci als o f  Nanking . Accordingly , one might assume that the Chinese 
government acted in thi s  instance out of e xasperation and was left 
wi th few other options short o f  a break in formal re lations with 
Hanoi . Beyond this ,  an e scalation o f  the di spute carried the dangers 
o f  open conflict and the possible involvement of other powers . I f  
the obj e ct of  the cance llation was to bring Vie tnam to hee l , i t  fai led , 
since i t  was followed almost immediately by an announcement that 
Vie tnam had accepte d ful l membership of COMECON . 
An impas se had been reached over the que stion o f  re fugee s  by 
late July , although talks continued at the vice-ministerial leve l , 
leaving open the possibility o f  a solution . Meanwhi le , an ominous 
note crept into the e xchange s between the two state s . On 10  July 
Vie tnam al leged that Chine se fighter p lanes had intruded into her 
ai rspace two days be fore , an allegation that was promptly denied . 
Mutual re criminations about violent incidents at border posts continued 
and China was also accused of having troops in Kampuchea , some of whom 
were said to have fired into Vietname se territory . Agains t thi s back­
ground of  charge s and events China celebrated Army Day wi th more 
flourish than on some other annive rsarie s . The keynote speech was 
de livered on 1 August by Hsu Hsiang-chien and published wi th the ti tle , 
' Heighten Our Vigi lance and Get P repared to Fight a War ' . The De fence 
Minister was presenting a global view and concentrated on the warl ike 
and hegemoni sti c activi tie s of the Soviet Union , but there was one 
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re ference to Vie tnam acti ng at the instigation o f  Mos cow .  Late r in 
the same week a senior Poli tburo member , Nieh Jung-chen , addre ssed 
a national conference on mi liti a  work , outlining p lans to conduct a 
people ' s  war of de fence under modern conditions using tactics o f  
partial and selective wi thdrawal in combination with ' tens of mi llions ' 
o f  troops , many o f  them mi litia force s under army command . An 
atmosphere o f  awarene s s  rather than ale rt and mobili zation was the 
theme of these widely publicized speeche s . 
The pre sent condi tion of the conflict leaves China i n  a di fficult 
posture wi th li ttle immedi ate prospect of achievi ng either the explicit 
or implicit obj ective s  o f  her policies . Chi na ' s  intere sts have been 
threatened by recent developments , but it seems almost as though China 
i s  sti l l  having trouble working out a framework wi thin whi ch to set 
the present conflict and that this may accoun t  for the short-run policy 
fai lure s . Marxi st-Lenini st theory provides little assistance in the 
interpretation o f  relations be tween state s that are either soci alist 
or in the process o f  bui lding socialism ,  apart from a vague assumption 
that these relations wi ll be generally harmonious under the formula o f  
proletarian i nternational i sm.  When relations wi th the Soviet Union 
became tense and led to open conflic t  an explanation was sought in the 
nature o f  the Soviet system. As De fence Ministe r  Hsu Hsiang-chien 
put i t  in  the speech re ferred to above , ' As the nature o f  the social 
system in the Sovie t Union has changed ,  so have i ts policies ; in  its 
forei gn re lations i t  is energetically pushi ng hegemoni sm and expansionism ' . 
The re lationship with Vie tnam was also once a close one , and 
the cli che used to describe it during the Vie tnam War was that the two 
nations were as close as the lips are to the teeth . China made much 
of i ts support o f  Vietnam during that di f fi cult conflict and probably 
feels that she is now being i l l-treated for her generosity and friend­
ship . But there has always been another component in the re lationship 
that goe s  back much further i n  hi story to the time s when the northern 
and central state s were under varyi ng forms of Chinese suzerainty . 
Accordingly Vi etnam is some times patroni zed and the highhandednes s  
wi th which China has treated her in thi s di spute , such as the uni lateral 
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di spatch o f  the MV Minghua and MV Chang Zi , qui te like ly stems 
from this cultural atti tude . Vie tnam i s  not seen as having progressed 
far along the road of bui lding sociali sm and is there fore more l ikely 
to be swayed by the Soviet social imperiali sts . Maj or blame i s  p laced 
on the Sovi e t  Union , described in the mi xed metaphorical terms that 
only the authori tative Renmin Ribao ' Commentator ' can manage , as sparing 
' . . .  no e fforts to bind independent Vietnam to its chariot for global 
expansion and have Vietnam pull its che stnuts out of the fire for i t ' . 
Vietnam i s  not yet accused of having ' changed colour ' in  the manner 
of Soviet socie ty and relations be tween the two peoples are sti l l  
described a s  being friendly , de spi te the actions o f  certain Vie tnamese 
public security o fficers . However there have been dark references to 
' other domestic cause s '  behind the persecution of Hoa people and the 
way i s  open for a tougher interpretation of Vietnamese policy . 
China ' s  interests in the region presently under threat include , 
firstly , a strategic concern about the possibi l i ty of a united Indochina 
under Hanoi control and we l l  armed on her southern border . China ' s  
support for eve n  an unpopular regime in Kampuchea and a small  mi li tary 
presence in Laos are intended to counter thi s  pos sibi l i ty ,  although 
the prospects for succe ss now look to be dimi ni shing . Secondly , China 
is anxious that the whole of I ndochina should not come under Soviet 
influence . Thi s po licy has been threatened to the extent that the 
cessation o f  aid to Vie tnam has forced Hanoi closer to Moscow than the 
leadership might choose and to the e xten t  that Vie tnamese influence 
in Laos and Kampuchea mi ght increase . A third interest motivating 
China ' s  policy is a de sire for friendly relations and some influence 
not simply around the South China Sea li ttoral but wi thin the ASEAN 
region . Rivalry with Vietnam in this region now threatens to deve lop 
into more open compe ti tion as the Soviet Union backs Hanoi more 
c losely and both seek to exploit the sensitive issue of Chinese govern­
mental prote ction of the intere sts of Overseas Chinese , some thi ng Peking 
has care ful ly di sowned since the early 1950s . Peking ' s actions in 
support o f  the Hoa cannot but cause unease in most ASEAN capitals , 
parti cularly Kuala Lumpur and ,Jakarta . The outbreak of serious Sino­
Soviet competition wi thin ASEAN would also endange r another Peking 
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ob j e c t i ve i n  t h e  d e ve l opme n t  o f  a s t ronge r and i n dep e n d e n t  AS EAN whi c h  
wo u l d  b e  ab l e  t o  re s i s t  s upe rp O'.·;e r  i n f l ue n c e  and , a l o n g  wi th o the r 
r e g i o n a l  group i n g s  and p roduce r c o op e r a t i ve uni o n s , do some th i n g  to 
b re ak s up e rpowe r hegemony by gradua l l y re s t r uc tur i ng the p re s e n t  
i n te rn a t i o n a l  o rde r . F i n a l ly , Ch i na ' s  gene r a l  s upport for th e p r i n c ip l e  
o f  nationa l sove re i gnty i s  unde rmi n e d  b y  Sovi e t  i n f l ue n ce i n  Vi e tnam 
and by the po s s i b l e  co l l ap s e of an i n depende n t  tho ugh i l l - i n te gr a t e d  
Kampuc hea . Th i s  p r i n c ip l e  i s  j e a lous ly de fended a s  p a r t  o f  the gene r a l  
f i ght agai n s t  he gemony a n d  the s e t  o f  a s s ump t i o n s  unde r ly i ng the Bre zhne v 
Do c t r i n e . I n  al l , the eve n ts i n  Vi e tnam and Kamp uchea p re s e n t  s uch 
s e rious thre a t s  to a range of Ch i n a ' s  vi tal i n t e re s t s tha t  the po s s ibi l i ty 
o f  s te rn a c ti o n  to p rote c t  the s e  i n te re s t s  wo uld not be i n con s i s te n t  
wi th de te r r e n t  a c t i o n  tak e n  b y  t h e  CPR on p re vi o u s  o c c a s i on s  whe n  the 
p e r c ep t i o n  o f  thre a t  wa s he ld to be s e r i o u s . 
VI ETNAM � REFUGEE S , 
BORDER WAR , REHAB I L I TAT I ON 
Hon . E . G .  Wh i t lam , AC , QC 
The contribution I might be able to make to thi s  seminar 
flows from an ove rseas vis i t  I made in May and June . When I planned 
that vi sit I had in mind to look into three matters conce rning Vietnam .  
First , the posi tion o f  refugees ,  whi ch nobody has mentioned up till  now , 
although i t  i s  a matter whi ch i s  going to concern Aus tralia as much 
as any other nation in thi s  region for many years to come . Secondly , 
I had in mind to study how serious in fact was the conflict in the 
region . Would i t  lead to a war between Vietnam amd China? Thi rdly , 
I wanted to see to what e xtent rehabi l i tation was required in Vie tnam . 
In al] these matters you wil l  notice that I was looking at i t  very 
much from the point o f  view o f  how directly was Australia involved , 
and to what e xtent could Australia � because o f  our resources and 
di stance thi s would largely mean in cooperation with other countries 
or through inte rnational organi zations � have an influence on the se 
three i ssue s . 
First , the re fugees . I looked into thi s matter in Geneva wi th 
the Inte rnational Conuni ttee o f  the Red Cross and with the Uni ted Nations 
Hi gh Conuni ssioner for Re fugee s .  I also discussed it in Bangkok , in Ho 
Chi Minh Ci ty and Hanoi , and in Nanning , the capital of Guangxi province , 
next to Vie tnam , and also in Guangzhou . In the European context re fugees 
used to mean at the beginning o f  the century those who were leaving the 
Tsaris t  Empire . Forty years ago they used to mean those who were 
leaving the German Empire , largely Jews . Thirty years ago they used 
to mean those who were leaving the new Russian Empi re . Nowadays those 
whom we cal l refugees may not be so c lassi fied in the technical sense 
under the re levant inte rnational conventions . The Jews were free to 
leave Germany be fore the outbreak of the Second World War . The people 
who are leaving Vietnam now in general are free to leave Vietnam . It  
i s  arguable whether they are re fugees . 
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Not only i n  the State Department , as o n e  o f  our American speakers 
has obse rved , but in Australia too there are a great number of people 
who are i ntent on saying ' We told you so ' .  They sai d  three years and 
more ago there would be a bloodbath in Vietnam when the country was 
reuni ted and the Ameri cans were expelled . There has not been a bloodbath 
in Vietnam and there i s  not likely to be one . Emotion i s  played up very 
crudely wi th evi l nostalgi c motive s . I am not suggesting that there 
i s  not di stre s s  i n  social and e conomic li fe in Vie tnam . I mus t stress 
one point about re fugees whi ch i s  not understood in Australi a . I did not 
really appreciate the full extent of i t ,  only a fraction of the extent 
o f  i t ,  be fore I met Mr Paul Hartling , the former conservative Prime 
Mini ster of Denmark who i s  now the UN High Commi ssioner for Re fugees . 
He pointed out that he was also goi ng to help the re fugees into Vietnam ; 
the re were already 1 5 0 , 000  o f  them. There have been almost as  many 
re fugees going into as corning out of Vietnam. You would never believe 
it reading the Australi an press . 
Without going into any great detai l ,  let me read the note s I 
made in June after my di scussions in Vie tnam .  
I was accompanied always by P rofe ssor Hoang Minh Giarn who i s  
the Chai rman o f  the Foreign Re lations Commi ttee o f  the National Assembly , 
an old socialist like so many o f  the people whom one meets in the 
capaci ty in which I went to Vietnam. They are people who have had 
experience in the public affairs of thei r  country for up to forty years . 
Whatever one may thi nk o f  people in conununi st countrie s o f  di fferent 
brands , they are at least people who know their j obs . One mi s se s  the 
exhi laration in Washington where one finds that a person i s  a maste r  
o f  a j ob after three months in i t .  In Vietnam one meets people who know 
all the nuances and have been familiar wi th them for more than a generation .  
Now this does not mean that they are a lways suffi ciently flexible . I 
got the impre s sion that in Vietnam people were pre tty well played out , 
they rather fe lt let down after the war . Nevertheless these people did 
have a long- standing , coherent view of what thei r  country should represent . 
They knew their hi story . They knew i t  under various sel f-appointed 
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protectors . I shall read what I was to ld by Mr Xuan Thuy , now the 
Vice-Chairman o f  the National Assembly in Hanoi . He said there were 
people of Chinese origin wishing to re turn to China and they were free 
to do so as long as thi s  was done by lawful means . Vie tnam did not 
wi sh to stop them going ; he asked me about the number o f  Vietnamese 
and Chinese in Australia . 
Next , I saw one o f  the 7ice -ministers o f  Foreign Affairs , 
Mr Phan Hien , the one who has been to the ASEAN countries and to Australia . 
He said the Cambodi an regime ' s  e xcesses are a direct consequence o f  thei r  
doctrinai re views and inabi lity t o  govern the country e f fective ly . Their 
bruta lity i s  impossible to understand e xcept as an ove r-reaction by 
an inexperienced and fri ghtened group of men . Thei r  hosti l i ty to 
Vie tnam is an attempt to bol ster their credibi lity and rally some 
support from the increasingly di s i l lusioned populace .  The extent of 
their brutali ty ,  which verges on genocide , i s  di fficult to believe . 
I t  is , however ,  corroborated time and again by Cambodian re fugees who 
are forced to flee to Vietnam .  Regarding the Chinese who wi sh to leave 
the ::;'outh , he expre ssed the view that they simply wanted an easy life , 
that there was no easy l i fe in s i ght for any Vie tnamese , but that i f  
they wi shed to leave Vietnam hi s government would not stand i n  their 
way . 
The last pe rson I saw was Mr Phan Van Dong , the Prime Mini ster . 
He sai d the Cambodians were hard to unders tand , but e ssentially they 
we re dependent on their northern friends . (May I interpose a conunent 
here . One finds in Russia or China , and I found in Vie tnam too , that 
you never name the country or the nation opposed to you . You re fer to 
i t  in directional terms . Zhou Enlai in a conversation wi th me seven 
years ago re ferred to the Russ ians as ' our northern neighbours ' .  Mr 
Kuzne tsov , who stands in for Bre zhnev and has had a long experience of 
foreign affai rs � he brought Czechoslovakia into line � re fe rred to 
' southern neighbours ' .  He used the term o ften ; only once did he use 
the word Chi na ( ' Ki tai ' ) . ) Mr Pham Van Dong also said that there were 
people of Chinese origin who wi sh to leave the country . They were free 
to do so through normal channel s , he sai d . 
6 2  
From other sources I formed the impre ssion that i f  one had 
$ 3 , 000 one could leave by air ;  i f  one had $ 2 , 000 , and I have heard 
from other source s $ 1 , 500 , o fficials look the othe r way when one sets 
off by sea . The departments in Australia seem to think that hal f o f  
the ' re fugees ' ,  as they cal l  themse lve s ,  are Chine se . 
wi ll  be seen to be an understatement as the years pass . 
That proportion 
The simple 
facts are that re fugees move both ways in Vietnam and are going to 
move around in our are a  for many years . Australia cannot hope that the 
re fugee s  wi ll  fade away . Even i f  some o f  them are pirate s ,  they can 
stay under the principle announced by Senator Greenwood some years 
ago � anyone opposed to communists can do what he likes , he is we lcome 
in Aus tralia . I t  i s  not suffi cient for the Aus tralian Mini ster for 
Immi gration to investi gate the problem of Vietnamese re fugee s  by vi siting 
every country in the region except Vietnam . The shadow Minister for 
Immigration ha s proposed that we should set up ho lding camps in Australia 
unti l the Uni ted Nations or some other international body can find 
another home for them . I cannot think ' o f  any inve stigations or proposals 
that are more futi le . 
Se condly on the war between Vietnam and Kampuche a .  Wi th al l 
respect to Ian Wi lson things have changed since China resorted to war 
in Korea . He r northern neighbour was then supporting her .  When she tried 
to re sort to war in 1958 she didn ' t  have the ships to incorporate Quemoy 
and Matsu . In 196 2 , when she recti fied the impe rial border wi th India , 
it was not known , not fully reali zed in the We st that she and the Soviet 
Union had spl i t  up . I would think it very unlikely that China wi l l  
invade Vie tnam; i t  would be so easy in those circums tance s for the 
Soviet Union then to invade China . Maybe I do not know enough . I have 
not spoken to Cambodi ans other than in Canberra since November 19 7 3  
when rather to the di spleasure o f  the Foreign Af fai rs Department , I 
called on Prince Sihanouk in hi s residence in the old French legation 
in Peking . I make bold to doubt all the storie s that appear in the 
newspapers about the treatment o f  people in Cambodia . I am sufficiently 
hardened to believe that the last re fuge of the patriot in Aus tralia 
i s  to blast the regime s  in post-war I ndochina . Nobody wi l l  j usti fy 
them so your cri tici sms wi ll  not be countered .  I al so have a hearty 
63 
s�spicion o f  every o f fi cial statement coming e i ther directly or through 
the pre s s  from the Sovi e t  Union or the Uni ted State s . There has been 
so much di sinformation spread from those two sources that I tend to 
di sbe lieve hal f  o f  them . One fac tor that has not been men tioned but 
mi ght be in Vie tnam ' s mind is that she wants to ensure her north- south 
communi cations . The Ho Chi Minh trai l i s  now a big highway but i t  i s  
vulnerable to attack from across the border . W e  are sti ll in  the same 
phase in regard to the I ndochina si tuation as we were throughout the 
sixties in regard to Chi na and the Soviet Union . We could not rid 
ourselve s  o f  the fdea that communi s ts must always be monoli thically 
conniving at the destruction o f  the rest o f  mankind . 
The antipathy between the Vie tnamese and Cambodians i s  long­
standing . I n  my conve rsation wi th Sihanouk he s ai d  i f  i t  had not been 
for Napoleon I I I , the Annami tes would have destroyed hi s nation . There 
is also two thousand years ' resentment by the Vietnamese against the 
Chine se . The rivalry between Vietnam and Kampuchea i s  now fome nted by 
the rivalry be tween the Sovi e t  Union and Chi na . I would very much doubt 
i f  Vietnam would have proceeded as far as she has but for the support 
of the Soviet Union or that Kampuchea would have done so but for the 
supplies that she has rece ived from China . My views on this i ssue have 
been derived from conve rsations in Moscow , in Hanoi and , to a lesser 
extent , in  Bangkok and Canton . 
My thi rd concern i s  the rehabi litation o f  Vietnam . I t i s painful 
to see , parti cularly in Hanoi , what an immense amount needs to be done . 
I f  one looks at the bridge over the Red River on the road to the international 
airport,  one sees at once that thi s sort of infrastructure is worse even 
than one see s in Bangladesh . I suppose that as a practi sing pol i tician 
unti l re cently I have to think out some arguments to bring home to 
people the urgency o f  such matters . There fore I put my argument on the 
leve l  o f  i nternational poli tics . I f  the Soviet Union i s  the only 
practical friend that Vie tnam has she wi l l  become more attached to the 
Soviet Union . The only nation that has given any support to Vietnam 
for years , other than China and the Soviet Union , i s  Sweden . The 
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ideology o f  the Swedi sh government whi ch initiate d  i t  o f  course i s  one 
which would appeal to me . We in the West can be very thank ful for the 
Swede s .  Otherwi se the on ly peop le whom the Vie tnamese would recognize 
as eve r  having done a thing for them would have been the Sovie t  Union 
and China . 
Our Ambassador , a ve ry fine career man , was somewha. L ;Ji ;.., t u:n:i�� 
when we took the long drive to the inte rnational airport from Hano i . 
I t  took nearly two hours . We were i n  a large vehic le and were clearly 
Europeans . When people , young people i n  particular , wanted to show 
their pleasure at seeing us they would hai l us as Russians . The urchins 
who ten years ago saw Europeans in Saigon used to yel l  out ' Americans ' .  
The Europe ans with whom the general population now i denti fies in Hanoi 
are the Russian s . We (Australians ) are doing a li ttle in Vietnam and 
i t  is re levant and appreciated We are doing what is urgently necessary , 
I \\Ould think , throughout Indochi na � that i s  deve loping the resource s 
o f  the country in agri cultural , pastoral , rural areas . Over a mi l lion 
people have been sent from Ho Chi Mi nh Ci ty to the countryside , and 
more are to be sent . Why people out of that city and Phnom Penh 
have been sent i s  because the population o f  such cities in flated by war , 
can only be fed by imports . Now the Ame ricans are not di sposed to send 
their surplus grains there and the European Economic Comnunity sends 
i ts agricultural surp luse s  e lsewhere . The present population cannot 
be fed . Thei r  food supplies must be increased . Australia i s  helping 
very wel l  and i t  i s  appreciated . Aid i s  coming from the Asi an Deve lop­
ment Bank , no thanks to the Ame ricans . I t  i s  coming , I be lieve , from 
the World Bank , no thanks to the Ame ricans . I take the point , however ,  
that there are no votes to be got i n  America f�om spending money on 
Vietnam . I also take the point that it is more urgent for America 
to normali ze relations wi th Peking than to normali ze them wi th Hanoi . 
One has to sympathize wi th the Americans : this i s  the only war they 
have ever lost and the loss was catastrophi c in in flation for them and 
for the rest of the world , including us , and in a diminution of American 
prestige and interest in our area . Nevertheless if we wi sh to encourage 
prosperi ty and securi ty in our region we wi l l  do what we can to see that 
the Ameri cans are as magnanimous as they can be when in a good mood . 
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They could do more than any other people in the world to help in 
rehabi litating thi s  country which i s  in i ts present position because 
of their obsession with i solating and boycotting China ever since the 
revolution in 194 9 . 
I have confined mysel f  to three matters , but they are 
continuing i ssue s  and i ssue s  on whi ch Australia can have some influence 
and should certainly try to e xe rcise i t .  
P E K ING ' S  SUPPORT FOR OVE RSEAS CH INESE : 
AN I NDONES IAN PARALLE L I N  1 9 5 9  
J . A . C .  Mac k i e  
Some o f  the parallels be tween Chi na ' s  reaction to the plight 
of the Ove rseas Chine se in Vie tnam in 1978  and her response to a 
somewhat simi lar pattern of treatment o f  Ove rseas Chinese in Indonesia 
in 1959-60 are striki ng enough to warrant brie f  di scus sion here . 
The Indonesi an story , reduced to i ts bare e ssentials , i s  as 
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fol lows . In May 1959 , the Indonesian government i ssued a regulation 
banning aliens from the further ope ration of re tail store s in rural 
areas , most of which were run by hua ch 'iao , either citi zens of Indonesia 
(o ften re ferred to as WNI-Chine se , Warga Negara Indonesia ) or citi zens 
o f  Chi na . Aliens were sti ll permi tted to operate store s in the large r  
town s , down to the level o f  kabupa ten capital , but as the move seemed 
symptoma tic of more widespread anti-Chinese fee ling and there was 
initially a good deal of uncertainty whether the ban applied to a l l  
Chine se -owned store s , o r  only tho se o f  aliens , considerable apprehension 
was aroused amongs t all the Chinese in Indonesia , who naturally sought 
protection through the Chinese Embassy . The move came at a time 
when a campaign was in full swing to e stablish ' Socialism a la 
Indone sia ' ,  whi ch Sukarno was then advocating as the basi s for his 
' Guided Democracy ' ,  a time when an intensely strong sociali st ideology 
was dominan t ,  capi tali sm and private enterpri se were regarded wi th 
great di s favour and the proce ss o f  nationa li zing the large Dutch 
estate s , banks and business house s ,  which had previous ly dominated the 
commanding heights o f  the Indone sian e conomy , was j ust in the process 
of being completed , creating a very large public sector now who lly in 
Indone sian hands . Nationali st sentiment was also very strong at that 
time and i t  seemed the e limination of Chinese trade -store s from rural 
areas might consti tute the beginni ng o f  a simi lar campaign against 
the other alien-dominated sectors of the economy , or at least o f  an 
attempt to transfer the lower leve l s  of the Chine se-dominated retai l 
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trade network into the hands o f  the newly emerging Indonesian private 
businessmen. 
Initially , the Chinese government did not express much concern 
about the ban , but the issue flared up as an international dispute in 
October-November 1959 , after a visit to Peking by the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister , Dr Subandrio , to discuss the ban and other matters . 
The truth about what happened during that visit is somewhat obscure , 
but according to one reliable report , the Chinese subjected Subandrio 
to very great pressure to have the ban revoked , but without success . 
In doing so they not only embarrassed and antagonized Subandrio (who 
was by no means aligned with the anti-Chinese elements in Jakarta 
poli tics) but also put at risk the last stages of  negotiations between 
the two countries over the implementation of the dual nationality 
agreement that Subandrio and an earlier Indonesian Foreign Minister 
had signed at the Bandung Conference in 1955 , which had then been 
greeted as a major diplomatic triumph for China , paving the way 
towards a solution of that thorny problem. In the weeks following 
Subandrio ' s  visit , the question of whether the ban would be maintained 
or whether the Indonesian government would back down in the face o f  
Chinese pressure became a subject o f  heated controversy between right­
and le ft-wing political parties in Jakarta . The issue was used by 
the leading anti-communists in Indonesia , including some prominent 
military leaders , as a convenient stick with which to embarrass both 
the Communist Party and President Sukarno , but as it turned out they 
were greatly assisted in this by the character of  Peking's response 
to the ban , which came to be seen as a heavy-handed attempt to inter­
fere in a matter of  Indonesia ' s  domestic jurisdiction . It seems to 
me that the Chinese authorities disastrously underestimated the 
intensity of  the Indonesian nationalist sentiment and anti-Chinese 
feeling that were aroused over this episode . The attempt to put 
pressure on the Indonesian government ultimately proved to be both 
fruitless and counterproductive , for it played into the hands of 
groups which were eager to exploit anti-Chinese sentiments , while it 
seriously comprom ised those elements , such as the Indonesian Communist 
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Party ,  which we re trying to uphold the intere sts o f  the Chinese 
traders . 
One can see parallels with the Vie tnamese situation i n  1978  
in several respects here . In both cases· ,  China ' s  actions exacerbated 
nationalist sentiment in the other country . In both cases , China was 
thought to be intervening , paradoxi cal ly , on beha l f  o f  a ' capi talist ' 
class o f  traders against whom a socialist government was imposing 
re stri ctions in the narre o f  the very ideology that Chi na stood for . 
And in both case s the hectoring methods and atti tude o f  the Peking 
government seem to have made matters a good deal worse . Es sentially , 
the aim o f  the Chinese government in the 1959 epi sode seems to have 
been to force President Sukarno to take firm ac tion against certain 
offi cers in  the Army who were taking advantage of the ban on alien 
traders to impose , under martial law regulations , a wider residence 
ban also on aliens in the rural areas . There might have been some 
j usti fi cation for the Chi nese s tand on humani tari an grounds � and , 
indeed , in the form in which i t  was finally promulgated by President 
Sukarno in November as Presidential De cree no 1 0  o f  1959 , the ban 
was modi fied in several signi fi cant respects � but the methods 
adopted by the Chinese seemed tantamount to blatant interference in 
Indonesia ' s  internal affairs and revealed a serious miscalculation of 
Indonesian reactions to such pressure . 
According to Davi d Mozingo , who has made the closest study of 
thi s epi sode , the Peking authori ties faced the awkward di lemma o f  
either doing nothing � and thus fail ing t o  uphold the intere sts o f  
their own nationals in Indonesia � or of trying to put pressure on 
the Indone sian government to wi thdraw or modi fy the ban , which they 
s aw as the work of an�i-communi st or ri ght-wing elements who were 
exploi ting anti -Chinese sentiment .
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But it was the way they tried 
to do this that revealed thei r  lack of sensibi lity to Indone sian 
nationali st susceptibil itie s , rather than the fact that they were 
intervening on behalf  of the Overseas Chinese . For their most 
controversial acts of pre s sure and intervention i n  a n  essential ly 
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domestic matter occurred after the cabinet de ci sion was made in early 
November to promulgate the ban in its final form over Pre sident Sukarno ' s  
name . To try to drive a wedge between him and hi s more anti -communist 
ministers ove r  the issue after that point was totally unreali sti c .  
The attempt to do so mere ly pushed the more moderate nationa lists over 
to the side o f  the anti-communi sts . There was wide spread anger in 
I ndonesia during November at the spe ctac le of Chi nese diplomatic 
personne l trave lling around rural areas o f  Java to encourage Chinese 
communi ties to refuse to relocate when ordered to do so . Whatever the 
rights and wrongs o f  the leg al i ssue s  at stake there , the affront to 
Indonesian nationalist sentiment on a matter whi ch was widely bel ieved 
to be one of dome sti c j urisdi c tion was very great . Equally i ll-advi sed 
was a campai gn o f  vehemently anti- Indonesian propaganda put out by 
Radio Peking i n  early Decembe r ,  coinciding with the despatch o f  a 
diplomatic note cal ling for immediate consultations over the matters 
in di spute . Phrases such as  ' the methods o f  terror used by Hitler 
against the Jews will be repeated i n  Indonesia ' and a call for all 
Chinese to ' ri se and fight ' the I ndonesian governmen� s ac tion ( the 
latter emanating from a pro-Peking newspaper in Hong Kong , not Radio 
Peking,  i t  must be admitted , but the di sti nction mattered l ittle in 
the heated atmosphere of that time ) all added fue l to the flame s . 
The Overseas Chinese were s ummoned to return home ' to the warm 
bosom of the motherland ' � apparently in the be lief that the economic 
dislocation thi s was bound to cause would compel the Indonesians to 
come to terms . Shortly afterwards , howeve r ,  Peking seems to have 
reversed i ts policy ; the radio programmes abruptly ceased and a second 
diplomatic note contained proposals which had been scaled down considerably . 
Indonesia re jected the call for negotiations , however , and throughout 
early 1960 China gave assistance wi th the evacuation o f  over 1 00 , 000 
Chinese . There are i ndications that in the admini stration of that 
programme , the Peking authorities were trying also to ' puni sh ' Indonesia 
by encouraging ski lled arti sans and even WNI-Chinese to accept repatriation . 
The e ffect of all thi s was that anti-Chinese sentiment in 
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lndone sia became far more in flamed than i t  would otherwi se have been . 
Only one party , the Conununi st Party , dared to speak out i n  de fence o f  
the Overseas Chine se . Sukarno and those o f  hi s ministers who were 
opposed to the more right-wing and anti -Chinese e lements felt unable 
to take a s tand publicly against them, although Sukarno later exerted 
hi s authori ty at a more suitable moment to bring the whole campaign 
to an end , a fter i t  flared up again in the middle o f  196 0 .  Chi na had 
cal led off i ts repatriation measures in April and gradually the 
tensions of the previous year died down . But it was the course o f  
domestic po liti cs within Indonesia whi ch determined the final outcome , 
not the e ffec ts o f  pressure from Peking . 
One can di scern another parallel with recent Chinese policy 
tr v.•.? :;- .. 3 · li etnam,  I think , in  the fact that China ' s  short-term policies 
over the 19 59-60 dispute clashed seriously with the much more success ful 
and far- sighted policies she had pursued in her relations with 
Indone sia during the 1 9 5 0s , which she again resumed in the years 1962-
6 5 . Not only did she success fully negotiate a se ttlement o f  the 
vexed problem o f  dual nationali ty but she also succeeded in drawing 
Sukarno into a mi li tantly anti -imperi alist grouping and what finally 
became known in 196 5  as the ' Jakarta-Peking axi s ' .  In that respect 
Chinese leaders made a far-si ghted assessment o f  the congruence of 
Chinese and Indonesian strategi c intere sts in seeking to exclude the 
other great powers from the exercise o f  poli ti cal i nfluence in thei r 
region , parti cularly the USA as the most imminently threatening o f  
them . .  One would like t o  think that the Chine se leaders today would 
simi larly reali ze that they share wi th Vietnam a simi lar long-term 
intere st in keeping Russian involvement and influence in the region 
to a minimum. It i s , after all , in si tuations o f  tension and conflict 
not tranqui llity ,  that the opportunities open to the Russians to 
acqui re influence are greates t .  But being human and fal lible like 
the rest o f  us , China ' s  leaders can on occasions allow their sense of 
patient long- range strategy to be c louded momentari ly by anger and 
mi sunderstandings about how other i ntense ly nationalistic Asi ans wi ll 
respond to their pres sures . 
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Footnotes 
1 .  The episode is discussed nnre fully in my chapter on ' Anti­
Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia , 1959-6 8 ' in J . A . C . Mackie (ed . ) ,  
The Chinese in Indonesia : Five Essays, Nelson, for AIIA , 
Melbourne , 1976 , pp . 8 2-97 . 
2 .  See David Mozingo , China ' s  Policy Towards Indonesia, Cornell 
University Press , I thaca , 1976 , pp . 157-91 . 
DI SCUSS ION I I  
Discussion in the second session began with a contribution 
from a parti cipant who had not long be fore re turned from a five -month ' s  
diplomatic assignment in Hanoi . He began by taking up the view 
expre ssed by Pre sident Carte r ' s  national securi ty adviser , Dr Brze zinski , 
that the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict was a ' proxy war ' between the 
Soviet Union and China , and counterpos ing to i t  the view that the war 
was primari ly the result of long-term hi storical fac tors in the 
immediate region . He said he did not be lieve the war was sub j e c t  to 
ei ther/or explanations , and that much attention had to be paid to 
' overlays and interactions ' i f  its  dynamics were to be unders tood . 
In relation to the immediate background to the conflict , he noted 
a re sol11tion o f  the Communi st Party o f  Vietnam in December 1976  which 
had spoken of a closene s s  of relations between the three I ndochinese 
countries in e conomic , pol i tical and defence matters which could wel l  
have caused alarm in Kampuchea . On the problem o f  the exodus of 
e thni c  Chinese from Vie tnam, he noted that the negoti ations were 
deadlocked ( for e xample , on the i s sue of repatriation of e thnic Chinese 
from Vietnam by ships sent by Chi na for the purpose ) because nei ther 
side could accept the negotiating formulas proposed by the other . As 
far as mi li tary forces o f  the two side s  in the border regions were 
concerned , he said that during his time in Hanoi the impre s sion was 
that there had been no signi fi cant new troop movemen ts in the area . 
On Vietnam-China relations , he said that hi s reading of Vietnamese 
statements sugge sted tha t Vie tnam e stimated that the decline in 
relations began wi th the death of Ho Chi Mi nh (September 196 9 ) . He 
also be lieved that US President Nixon ' s  197 2 vi sit to China had ' upset 
the Vietname se a good deal ' . On China ' s  perception o f  Vie tnam as ' the 
Cuba of Asia ' , he said the Chinese saw Vie tnam as acting in conce rt 
with the Soviet strategy of encirc lement of China � the recent coup 
in Afghanistan had only ' spi ced ' these Chine se sensitivi ties . He also 
noted a degree of rivalry be tween Chi na and Vietnam in Southeast Asia . 
At the same time he di scerned in re cent Chi nese statements indi cations 
that the Chinese see the Vie tnamese as ultimate ly wanting to put some 
distance between themselve s  and the Soviet Union . 
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On Vietnam's relations with the Soviet Union , he perceived a 
difference of emphasis in statements by the two sides on Vietnam ' s  
July entry into COMECON , with the Russians emphasizing the political 
factors leading to Vietnam's joining the bloc , and the Vietnamese 
emphasizing the economic side . 
He professed himself 'a little more optimistic than some who 
spoke this morning ' about prospects of improved relations between 
the United States and Vietnam � if not fully 'normalized ' relations , 
at least diplomatic relations. He said he thought diplomatic relations 
could come within six months or so. 
In a comment on China ' s  relations with Laos , the speaker noted 
that the Chinese aid programme to Laos was continuing , although he 
was doubtful of a claim made by an earlier speaker that its road­
building troops were still in the country . He noted that the Laotians 
in their statements and conversations laid stress on the point that 
they were not , as is generally believed , subservient to Vietnam . 
A second speaker , referring to the negotiations on the problem 
of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam , claimed that the Chinese ' were not yet 
negotiating seriously ' in that they were requiring the Vietnamese to 
sign statements which included Chinese political rhetoric on the 
affair . For example , the documents put forward by the Chinese for 
Vietnamese signature referred to the ' ostracism , persecution and 
expulsion' of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam . He said he believed that 
the Chinese position was influenced by a subjective resentment of the 
prominence of the international role played by Vietnam in recent times . 
He said the Chinese 'wished to cut the Vietnamese down to size' . 
The question of the further motives of the Chinese in their 
policy towards Vietnam was raised by a third speaker . 
Succe ssive speakers ranged wide ly over this question , canvassing 
the following major and minor points: 
China's aim to cause economic disruption in the north of 
Vietnam by encouraging the movement out of Vietnam of Chinese with 
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ski l l s  of vital importance to the economic activi ty o f  that part o f  
the country . I n  thi s  connection , re ference was made b y  several 
speakers to Vietnamese allegations o f  a Chine se-organized ' fi fth 
column ' in Vie tnam , which spread rumours of an impending war be tween 
the two countries , a war in which peop le o f  Chinese origin living in 
Vi8 tnam would be regarded by the Vietname se as ' trai tors ' ,  or 
potential traitors , if they did not re turn to China . One speaker 
expressed doubt that the Vie tname se would have wanted to lose these 
people , who se departure in numbers exceeding 100 , 000 had ' torn the 
guts out o f ' tLe northern economy . 
The rneasure s taken against pri vate trade rs in Ho Chi Minh City , 
whi ch had struck particularly hard at people o f  Chinese de scen t .  
l\ re cent vi sitor to Vietnam found Chinese allegations o f  
' ingrati tude ' o n  the part of the Vietnamese in re lation to Chine s e  war 
aid j u�:; ti fie d .  He sai d : ' The Vie tnamese now are playing down the 
aid the Chinese gave them . But when you are in Vietnam about two out 
of every three trucks you see have the Chinese emblem on them ' . 
China , in terms o f  i ts attempts to win the good opinion o f  
Southeast Asian nations , mi ght have a n  interest in seeing Vie tnam 
more close ly as sociated wi th the Sovi e t  Union . Wi th such a pub l i c  
image in Southeast Asia , China might s e e  Vietnam as les s  of a threat 
than a Vie tnam with an independent stance and perhaps an independent 
mode l o f  deve lopment . 
The is sue o f  citi zenship . In 1 9 5 5  there was an agreement 
conc l uded between the two sides that Chinese resident in Vietnam ,  and 
Vie tnamese resident in China , should be sub j e c t  to a pol i cy of encouragement 
by the re spective authorities to adopt the local citi zenship voluntari ly . 
By 1 9 7 7  people of Chinese ori gin in Vie tnam who wi shed to re tain 
Chinese nationality we re obj e c ts o f  suspi cion , seen as possible securi ty 
ri sks , espe cially in view of Vie tnam ' s conflict with Kampuchea . The re 
i s  the addi tional compli cation that in 1956 the Ngo Dinh Diem regime 
in South Vie tnam forced a l l  people o f  Chinese origin to take Vi etnamese 
nationality .  The North Vi e tname se at that time undertook to consul t 
wi th the Chine se government on thi s que s tion after the liberation o f  
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South Vie tnam, and from 1960 onwards the National Liberation Front 
of South Vietnam promised to cancel the Diem edic t  concerning the 
Chinese in South Vietnam. However ,  in  197 6 ,  the se people were 
i nstructed to regi ster to vote as Vietnamese nationals , the Vietnamese 
authori ties mai ntaining that the Vie tnamese nationality held by the se 
people was ' a  reality left over from history ' . One speaker described 
this atti tude as ' a  signi ficant policy error ' on the part of the 
Vie tname'se . Another speake r  saw inconsistency in China ' s  position in 
that it claimed the right , now that the numbers o f  people wi shing to 
cross into China had become so large , to close its doors to people 
livi ng in Vie tnam who di sclaim Vie tnamese citi zenship but whom China 
now inte rprets as Vie tnamese c i ti zen s . Thi s speaker said : ' I f 
there i s  any truth i n  the ' fi fth col wnn ' theory , and i f  the Chinese 
we re responsible for stimulating the movement o f  people out of 
Vie tnam , then one must conclude that they seriously miscalculated the 
numbers who would wan t  to come across ' .  One speaker estimated that 
the exodus was ' about hal f ' made up of border dwellers who had been 
wooed by the Chi ne se , rather than city dwellers proper . The general 
phenomenon of the sensi tivi ty on citi zenship i ssues on the part o f  
countries whi ch have recently acquired independence , not only i n  
A s i a  but in Africa as wel l ,  was pointed out by one spe aker who 
predic ted that for a long time to come there wil l  be a process o f  
relocation o f  e thni c  minoriti e s  from other countrie s  back to the lands 
of their ancestors . 
There was some discussion as  to the correct location in time 
of the beginning o f  Sino-Vie tname se diffe rence s .  A number of speakers 
placed it at the beginning o f  the ' proletarian cultural revolution ' 
in  1966 , quoting various sources and incidents in support o f  thi s idea . 
Another speaker pointed out di fferences over the mi litary tactic s  to 
be pursued by the Vietnamese in the period immediately preceding the 
Tet offensive of early 1 968 . 
A numbe r  of speakers maintained that the i ssue o f  Chinese residents 
in Vie tnam was a secondary matter i n  the di spute � secondary , for 
example , to the emerging alli ance of the Uni ted State s , China and 
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Japan which the Vietnamese perceive as greatly t o  their di sadvantage . 
Emergence o f  thi s alliance could only deepen Vie tnam ' s  dependence on 
the Soviet bloc . 
There was considerable di scussion o f  Vietnamese e fforts to create 
a new counte rweight through i ts contacts wi th Wes tern countries to 
replace the Chinese counterwei ght in i ts relations with the Soviet Union 
which had di sappeared with the col lapse of i ts past cordial re lations 
wi th China . 
I n  thi s  connec tion ,  there was talk o f  Vie tnamese e fforts to 
reach agreement wi th Western compani e s  and even governments on development 
pro j ects , including development of its oi l resources .  There was also 
discus s ion on the prospec t  o f  the li fting o f  the US embargo on trade 
wi th Vie tnam once diplomatic relations between the two countries are 
e stablished .  The ac tive preparatory work o f  some American commercial 
interests who look forward wi th keen anticipation to thi s  turn of 
affairs was re ferred to . 
One speaker sounded a general warning agains t what he described 
as ' cultural imperialism ' . He said that be fore Australians expressed 
wonder at how ' the se people got themselves i nto a position like this ' 
in  considering the China-Vie tnam-Kampuchea imbroglio , they should 
reflect on Australia ' s  own ' utter i nexperience ' and ' consi derable 
incapaci ty '  in handling the most marginal of frictions between our 
neighbours , and involving ourselve s  in i ssues of tension wi th 
neighbours , or for that matter with others . He suggested that in 
terms o f  ' cri sis  management ' Australia was sti ll very much in the 
be ginners ' c lass , and invi ted seminar participants to consider the fac t 
that in the cri s i s  under di scussion , particularly that between China 
and Vie tnam, matters could come to the most extraordinary point in 
terms of the language employed by the two sides in the ir official 
s tatements , and yet be kept wi thin ' manageable ' bounds . 
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